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Abstract
Detection of Coached Malingering of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
Jennifer L. Guriel, M.A.
Although assessing malingering is recognized as a challenge to mental health
professionals who evaluate posttraumatic stress symptomatology, little empirical
investigation into which factors may impact an individual’s ability to feign symptoms of
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has been conducted. This study utilized 113
undergraduate students in a simulation design to examine the effects that traumatic
exposure (i.e., a history of experiencing or witnessing a traumatic event) and coaching
(i.e., providing participants with information on PTSD symptoms and strategies for
avoiding detection on psychological validity indices) had on the ability to feign
posttraumatic stress symptoms. Vulnerability of three different types of psychological
assessment instruments to malingered PTSD was analyzed. The Personality
Assessment Inventory, Trauma Symptom Inventory, and Miller Forensic Assessment of
Symptoms Test served as the representative for each assessment type: general
multiscale self-report, trauma-specific multiscale self-report, and interview, respectively.
Overall, this investigation demonstrated that providing simulators with diagnostic
information on PTSD symptoms and strategies for avoiding detection on psychological
validity indices was effective in assisting simulators with presenting as if they were
suffering from but not significantly exaggerating posttraumatic stress symptoms. This
was manifest in group mean differences between coached and naive respondents on
several validity and clinical scales across measures. Trauma history, on the contrary,
did not impact simulators ability to feign PTSD symptoms in any meaningful way.
Participants who experienced a traumatic event were not better able to feign PTSD than
were those without any history of experiencing or witnessing a traumatic event.
Furthermore, a positive trauma history did not mediate the exaggerated clinical
presentation commonly seen with PTSD simulation research. Also, no interactions
between coaching and trauma history were detected, suggesting that coaching, alone,
accounted for these differences. Despite the coaching effects, 97% of all respondents
were correctly classified as malingering.
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Malingering PTSD 1

Detection of Coached Malingering of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
During the past 20 years, research regarding the ability to detect malingering, the
feigning of symptoms for secondary gain, in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
claimants has grown rapidly. PTSD is an anxiety disorder resulting from exposure to a
traumatic event (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1994). It is a diagnosis
particularly vulnerable to malingering because it is characterized by a number of
subjective symptoms and can be associated with reinforcing financial and personal
gains (e.g., disability benefits; Resnick, 1997). PTSD is also characterized by a variable
symptom profile and is highly comorbid with a variety of clinical and personality
disorders (e.g., depression, substance abuse), making detection of malingering a
challenging endeavor (APA).
Overview and Assessment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
PTSD, in its current diagnostic classification (APA, 1994) is an anxiety disorder
characterized by psychological and/or physical sequelae resultant from experiencing a
traumatic life event. According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, fourth edition (DSM-IV; APA) criteria (Criterion A), a traumatic event can be
any instance in which an individual feels helpless, fearful, or horrified while experiencing
or witnessing the perceived threat of death or serious harm to oneself or others.
Exposure to such a trauma is the first of six criteria required for a diagnosis of PTSD.
The PTSD criteria that make up the symptom profile contain 17 symptoms across three
general categories: (Criterion B) reexperiencing of traumatic events (e.g., nightmares,
intrusive thoughts; (Criterion C) persistent avoidance of trauma-relevant stimuli (e.g.,
avoidance of the trauma scene, emotional numbing); and (Criterion D) autonomic
hyperarousal (e.g., sensitized startle response). The final diagnostic criteria for PTSD
require that symptoms must be present for at least one month and that the individual
must be experiencing functional impairment in at least one setting.
Prevalence rates for PTSD are highly variable, ranging from 1% to 58% (APA,
1994), primarily depending on the relative risk and the type of trauma experienced for
the population sampled (Breslau, Davis, Andreski, & Petersen, 1991). For example,
Blanchard and Hickling (1997) reported a 9% lifetime prevalence among motor vehicle
accident survivors, while Kulka et al. (1990) estimated that PTSD rates in combat
veterans are as high as 15%. Breslau et al. found that PTSD was diagnosed in as many
as 80% of rape survivors.
In a review of civilian-related trauma and PTSD, Resnick, Falsetti, Kilpatrick, and
Freedy (1995) found that exposure to a traumatic event is relatively common (40% to
70% with subsequent PTSD prevalence rates ranging from 18% to 28%). Bernat,
Ronfeldt, Calhoun, and Arias (1998) found that approximately 67% of college students
had experienced at least one traumatic event. Of these, 12% met diagnostic criteria for
PTSD. In the largest study to date on the prevalence of traumatic experience and PTSD
(the national comorbidity survey), 60% of women and 51% of men between the ages of
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15 and 54 were found to have experienced at least one traumatic event and 8% were
estimated to have a PTSD diagnosis at some point during their lifetime (Kessler,
Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, & Nelson, 1995).
Although a universally accepted “gold standard” measure for PTSD assessment
is lacking, inclusion of a structured interview is widely recognized as a standard
assessment method (e.g., Keane, 1995). Furthermore, the following guidelines are
recommended by experts in PTSD assessment (Keane; Resnick, 1997): First, a
detailed history should be obtained to assess premorbid functioning and to identify the
presence of traumatic experience(s). Secondly, corroborating data should be collected
from outside sources (e.g., physicians or caregivers). Third, empirically validated
measures of PTSD symptoms (as well as related clinical and personality variables)
should be employed. Finally, the patient should explain how symptoms affect
functioning.
The development of diagnostic and symptom-specific PTSD instruments has
flourished since PTSD was first recognized as a legitimate diagnosis in 1980. PTSD
assessment methods have included psychophysiological measures (e.g., Orr & Pitman,
1993), projective tests (e.g., Frueh & Kinder, 1994), and symptom checklists (e.g., Foa,
Riggs, Dancu, & Rothbaum, 1993). In addition, structured interviews (e.g., ClinicianAdministered PTSD Scale for DSM-IV [CAPS; Blake et al., 1997]) and uni- scale selfreport measures (e.g., Mississippi Scale for Combat-Related PTSD [MS-PTSD; Keane,
Caddell, & Taylor, 1988]) are currently available to assist clinicians in the assessment of
individuals presenting with posttraumatic symptomatology. Finally, clinicians regularly
incorporate information from multi-scale self-report instruments (e.g., MMPI-2) in PTSD
assessment (e.g., Elhai, Gold, Frueh, & Gold, 2000; Keane, Malloy, & Fairbank, 1984).
Overview and Assessment of Malingering
Malingering is defined in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) as “the intentional production
of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by
external incentives…” (p. 683). The defining feature of malingering is the inclusion of a
motivational specifier, which necessitates that an individual be consciously aware that
s/he is providing deceptive information in an attempt to receive secondary gain via
external incentives (APA, 1994; Cunnien, 1997; Franzen, Iverson, & McCracken, 1990).
Precise prevalence rates for malingering are not known at this time. Rogers
(1997) reported that there are currently no available prevalence rates for malingering in
non-forensic settings (i.e., in psychological assessment settings where there is no legal
question involved). This is noteworthy because statistics from forensic evaluators may
be spuriously inflated relative to those in non-forensic settings due to the adversarial
nature that commonly accompanies such evaluations (e.g., Hickling, Taylor, Blanchard,
& Devineni, 1999). Although reliable base rate statistics are unavailable, it is known that
clinicians generally do not include formal assessments of malingering in their standard
assessment protocols (e.g., Cunnien, 1997). The lack of a “gold standard” assessment
instrument and the threat of client confrontation or legal consequences may be factors
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that cause clinicians to be apprehensive when it comes to assessing for malingering
(Hickling et al.; Koch, Shercliffe, Fedoroff, Iverson, & Taylor, 1999; McGuire, 1999;
Resnick, 1997; Rose, Hall, Szalda-Petree, & Bach, 1998).
Three research methods have been most commonly applied in studying
malingering: (a) simulation designs, (b) known-groups comparisons, and (c) differential
prevalence designs (for a detailed description see Rogers, 1997). Simulation designs
are the most convenient of these designs. Simulations generally include an analogue
setting in which (presumably non-disordered) individuals are offered a small incentive to
respond to assessment material in a particular manner. Simulators are then compared
to control participants and/or clinical criterion groups. Simulation designs offer maximum
experimental control, but questionable generalizability because they often do not
include clinical comparison groups (i.e., people who have been diagnosed with a clinical
syndrome) (Rogers & Cruise, 1998). Known-groups comparisons are defined by
Rogers (1997) as those in which bona fide patients and malingerers are compared in
terms of similarities and differences. They afford the greatest degree of generalizability
to clinical settings, but are plagued by the challenge of accurately identifying and
describing the known groups (i.e., persons who have responded dishonestly and those
who truly have the disorder being investigated). Differential prevalence designs offer the
weakest methodology by utilizing groups that are assumed to be different in their
response styles (e.g., compensation-seeking veterans are often compared to nonservice-connected veterans because it is assumed that applying for disability benefits
increases the likelihood of malingering).
Coaching, or providing simulators with information about the disorder to be
feigned and/or giving strategies to avoid detection on psychological tests, is a key
element in malingering research. Traditionally, it was assumed that malingerers were
naive to testing because they had not sought or been provided with information
regarding psychological disorders or testing (Rogers, 1997). This notion has now been
largely discounted (e.g., Elhai, Gold, Sellers, & Dorfman, 2001; Hall & Poirier, 2001).
For example, Wetter and Corrigan (1995) found that nearly 50% of attorneys believe
that clients should be informed about validity scales prior to psychological testing. It is
now believed that persons motivated to simulate psychological symptoms may be well
informed on both diagnostic symptoms and the design and scope of psychological
assessment instruments (Rogers).
Empirical investigation into the effects of coaching has shown that although
providing disorder-relevant information (e.g., symptoms) has little effect on performance
(Lamb, Berry, Wetter, & Baer, 1994; Wetter, Baer, Berry, Robison, & Sumpter, 1993),
strategies for avoiding detection (e.g., avoidance of endorsing bizarre symptoms) can
be quite useful to simulators (Baer, Wetter, & Berry, 1995; Rogers, Bagby, &
Chakraborty, 1993). Providing information about validity scales designed to detect
malingering is generally more helpful to simulators than is simply exposing them to
diagnostic criteria for the disorder they are being asked to malinger (Rogers et al.). This
has been demonstrated in both of the best validated measures of malingering detection,
the MMPI-2 (Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemer, 1989) and the
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Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS; Rogers, 1992) (Rogers et al.;
Wetter et al.). Finally, clinical judgment is not always reliable or valid in identifying
coached malingerers. For instance, Hickling, Blanchard, Mundy, and Galovski (2002)
found that well-trained clinicians failed to detect malingering in all cases when they were
unaware of the presence of a coached malingerer in their caseload for evaluating motor
vehicle accident survivors presenting with PTSD symptoms.
Importance of Assessing for Malingering in PTSD Evaluations
Malingering is an important issue in the assessment of PTSD for a variety of
reasons. First, PTSD is unique with respect to most psychiatric disorders in that it
requires that there be a cause and effect relation between a traumatic event and
subsequent psychological symptomatology. Because the current PTSD diagnostic
criteria (DSM-IV; APA, 1994) are dominated by subjective experiences (e.g., intrusive
thoughts, feelings of detachment), clinicians are forced to rely heavily on client selfreports in arriving at diagnostic conclusions. This is complicated by the argument that
PTSD is easily faked (Elhai et al., 2001; Frueh & Kinder, 1994; Lees-Haley, 1986). For
example, Lees-Haley and Dunn (1994) found that 86% of untrained, nonclinical
participants were able to endorse symptoms in a manner consistent with a PTSD
diagnosis. Similarly, Hickling et al. (2002) found that 100% of professional actors, highly
trained to simulate PTSD, were able to “fool” experienced clinical evaluators when the
evaluators were unaware of the presence of simulators within their evaluation group.
The malingering detection rate increased dramatically, however, when examiners were
informed of the presence of simulators amongst their interviewees. In that case, over
91% of the feigners were identified by clinical judgment. Unfortunately, despite being
acknowledged as a serious threat to accurate diagnosis, malingering is often not directly
assessed in PTSD evaluations (e.g., Cunnien, 1997).
There are several reasons that an individual may be motivated to malinger
PTSD. The primary motivation is to obtain financial remuneration (Lees-Haley 1992;
McGuire, 1999; Resnick, 1997), from governmental agencies (i.e., Veterans or Social
Security benefits; e.g., Mayers, 1995) or from civil litigation (e.g., Early, 1990). PTSD
may also be feigned to receive medical or psychiatric treatment or to gain inpatient
status (e.g., Elhai et al., 2001). Malingering PTSD could also allow the client to
embellish victimization (e.g., Resnick) or to minimize or escape criminal liability (e.g.,
Baer & Miller, 2002; Melton, Petrila, Poythress, & Slobogin, 1997). Finally, the
potentially large incentives (e.g., monetary or secondary gain via attention, etc.)
involved with PTSD claims may increase motivation to malinger, even in a person who
would not ordinarily engage in deceitful or malevolent behavior. Rogers’ (1997)
adaptational model of malingering in which the client has “substantial personal
investment” and stands to gain considerably from feigning symptoms best describes the
motivation in cases of feigned PTSD.
Malingered PTSD may occur in three different ways. Clients may completely
manufacture their symptoms (i.e., pure malingering), exaggerate the extent of their
injuries (i.e., partial malingering), or attribute pre-existing symptoms to the current
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trauma (i.e., false imputation) (Resnick, 1997). Unfortunately, such behaviors may not
be uncommon. Hall and Poirier (2001) reported that all three types of malingering might
be found during PTSD evaluations. In addition, Resnick cited a study in which 40% of
those considered totally disabled (resultant from PTSD) who were receiving benefits
showed no indication of actual disability. Clearly, there is a need to ensure that
clinicians are properly trained and equipped to detect malingering during PTSD
evaluations.
Also challenging to clinicians is the notion that it is difficult to differentiate
between malingered and genuine PTSD because a grossly pathological symptom
profile (which may appear to be symptom overreporting), is believed to be associated
with legitimate PTSD cases (Elhai et al., 2001; Hyer, Fallon, Harrison, & Boudewyns,
1987; Resnick, 1997). The primary reason for this is the high comorbidity that PTSD
shares with both clinical and personality disorders (e.g., depression, substance abuse)
(Keane, 1995). Furthermore, PTSD often includes a variety of symptoms, resulting in an
elevated overall symptom profile (Hyer et al.). These factors create difficulty in accurate
diagnosis, particularly differential diagnoses.
Empirical research into the assessment of malingered PTSD has targeted
psychophysiological (e.g., Gerardi, Blanchard, & Kolb, 1989), interview (Rogers, Kropp,
Bagby, & Dickens, 1992), projective (Frueh & Kinder, 1994), and uni-scale self report
inventory (Morel, 1998) assessment formats. The most commonly studied instruments,
however, are multi-scale self-report inventories (e.g., the MMPI and MMPI-2; Wetter et
al.,1993). Another objective, self-report, multi-scale personality inventory, The
Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 1991), has recently gained favor for its
good psychometric properties and ease of administration. To date, only three studies
have examined the effectiveness of the PAI in detecting feigned PTSD.
Using a simulation design, Liljequist, Kinder, and Schinka (1998) compared PAI
profiles of alcohol abusing veterans, with (n = 20) and without (n = 30) PTSD to those of
undergraduates instructed to malinger PTSD (n = 27) or answer honestly (control) (n =
30). Simulators were provided with a “glossary of terms to provide them with uniform
definitions of words used on adult personality inventories” and were permitted to refer to
this glossary as well as a list of combat-related PTSD symptoms during testing. Veteran
data were archival, collected during Veterans Affairs Medical Center (VAMC) screening.
As predicted, the malingering students produced profiles with higher negative
impression management (NIM) and malingering index (MI) scores than the other three
groups, suggesting that these PAI validity scales may be effective in identifying
individuals malingering PTSD.
Furthermore, malingerers scored higher than controls on seven PAI clinical
scales and both veteran groups had higher clinical scale elevations than controls.
Although malingerers scored higher than those in the PTSD group on seven clinical
scales, only two were those predicted to differentiate malingerers from PTSD patients
(anxiety and schizophrenia). Notably, the malingerers did not score significantly higher
than the PTSD group on the anxiety-related disorders, depression, or borderline scales.
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Because these scales represented the highest elevations for the PTSD group and are
thought to be critical to a PTSD profile (Liljequist et al., 1998), there is concern that
distinguishing true PTSD patients from malingerers would be difficult using the PAI
alone.
Calhoun, Earnst, Tucker, Kirby, and Beckham (2000) extended the work of
Liljequist et al. (1998) by applying PAI LOGIT diagnostic rules to determine whether
individuals simulating PTSD would meet diagnostic criteria. These rules are derived
from empirical algorithms of DSM-IV diagnostic criteria and are included in the PAI
Software System (Morey, 1991). Calhoun et al. compared 23 veterans with combatrelated PTSD (diagnosed by meeting criteria on the Clinician-Administered PTSD
Scale) with 23 male undergraduates instructed to fake PTSD and avoid detection and
23 men randomly selected from the PAI standardization sample to serve as a control
group. Veterans and simulators completed the PAI and Mississippi Scale for CombatRelated PTSD (MS-PTSD; Keane et al., 1988).
LOGIT diagnostic analyses correctly classified 83% of the PTSD group as
meeting DSM-IV criteria. This analysis was designed to assess sensitivity, or the
number of people who truly malingered and were identified as such, and specificity, or
the number of people who responded honestly and were not identified as malingering,
of the PAI in malingering detection. While no control participants were classified as
having PTSD, 70% of the malingerers’ profiles yielded elevations sufficient to fulfill
diagnostic criteria. When using the recommended cutoff score for non-clinical samples
(> 8) the NIM scale identified 83% of malingerers. Unfortunately, it also misclassified
65% of the true PTSD group as malingering. When the clinical cutoff was used (> 13)
only 43.8% of malingerers were identified, but the false negative rate dropped to 35%.
Liljequist et al.’s (1998) recommended > 3 cutoff was used for the MI scale. This
resulted in the identification of 56% of the malingerers and 22% false negatives in the
PTSD patients. Nearly all (91%) of the simulators scored above 107 (suggestive of
PTSD) on the MS-PTSD and no differences were detected between the PTSD and
student groups on this measure, suggesting that the MS-PTSD did not differentiate
malingerers from true PTSD patients.
Scragg, Bor, and Mendham (2000) reported that the PAI was useful in detecting
feigned PTSD when compared to groups of true PTSD patients and controls. After
reading information about PTSD, 44% of simulators were able to complete the PAI with
an elevated clinical profile. However, over half of those individuals were detected by the
PAI NIM scale (T > 85). Thus, the authors reported that, when using the T > 85 cutoff,
the PAI was successful in identifying 80% of simulators who either failed to successfully
produce a PAI profile consistent with PTSD or produced an elevated but invalid profile.
In conclusion, based on these preliminary empirical investigations, the PAI may be
helpful in differentiating between malingerers and honest responders, but not
necessarily in distinguishing simulators from PTSD patients.
Another multiscale assessment measure that may be useful in PTSD evaluations
is the Trauma Symptom Inventory (TSI; Briere, 1995). The TSI is an objective, 100-item
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self-report instrument designed to assess psychological symptoms commonly
associated with traumatic experiences (Briere). The TSI is unique because it is the only
PTSD assessment instrument that contains scales specifically designed to appraise
response style. The TSI contains ten PTSD-relevant clinical scales and three validity
scales (atypical responding, inconsistency, and response level), each with a mean of 50
and standard deviation of 10. The clinical scales include anxious arousal, dissociation,
depression, sexual concerns, anger/irritability, dysfunctional sexual behavior, intrusive
experiences, defensive avoidance, impaired self–reference, and tension reduction
behavior.
The susceptibility of the Trauma Symptom Inventory to malingering was
assessed using an undergraduate simulator sample in a repeated measures design
(Edens, Otto, & Dwyer, 1998). Students were asked to respond: (1) honestly; or (2) as if
they had been involved in an automobile accident (n = 36 male; n = 59 female) or had
been sexually assaulted (n = 60 females). All participants were told to assume that they
were seeking civil compensation for psychological trauma and were provided with DSMIV criteria to assist in answering TSI questions during the malingering condition.
Because the order of conditions was counterbalanced to control for order effects, formal
analysis of order effects was not performed.
Students with basic information about PTSD symptomatology produced elevated
TSI profiles for all scales (indicative of trauma-related sequelae). When using the
recommended cutoff score of T > 90 (Briere, 1995) for the Atypical Response validity
scale, 73% of malingered protocols were incorrectly identified as being valid. When
using a more conservative cutoff score of T > 61 (devised from distribution analysis of
half of this sample), however, the following statistics were obtained: overall hit rate =
85%, negative predictive power = 81%, positive predictive power = 91%, sensitivity =
78%, and specificity = 92%. This cutoff score was cross validated and subsequently
applied to a variety of clinical samples (including in- and out-patient cases with
diagnoses including PTSD, mood disorders, and personality disorders) via archival
data. This was done to assess the clinical false positive rates using the reduced cut-off
score. Although the ATR cut-off score of T > 61 had generally good specificity in clinical
populations (false positive rates ranged from 6.3% to 18.9%), with undiagnosed
outpatients the false positive rate was 55.3%. The authors speculate that this may be
due to the fact that ATR elevations, like F scale elevations on the MMPI-2, can indicate
a “cry for help,” or severe distress as well as malingering or exaggeration. In conclusion,
the TSI is a promising tool in PTSD and malingering assessment, yet further research
into its vulnerability to coaching is needed.
Unlike the TSI, the Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms (MFAST; Miller,
2001) is not limited to use with PTSD evaluations. The MFAST was empirically derived
to serve as an abbreviated measure of response style. The MFAST was created to
serve as an abbreviated parallel to the widely used Structured Interview of Reported
Symptoms (SIRS; Rogers, 1992). Preliminary validational research on the MFAST has
demonstrated that the MFAST is a tool that shows promise in accurately distinguishing
between honest and dishonest response styles (Zapf & Galloway, 2002). For example,
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in an initial investigation to determine the effectiveness of the MFAST in detecting
malingering during disability screenings, Miller, Guy, and Davila (2000) found that
malingerers (as defined by SIRS scores) earned significantly higher total MFAST scores
than did honest responders.
Guriel et al. (in press) employed the TSI and the M-FAST in a simulation design
with undergraduate students to assess the impact of symptom specific and malingering
strategy information on the detection of malingered PTSD. Participants who were
provided with symptoms and/or symptoms and strategies were found to be no more
successful at malingering PTSD than were those who were not provided with this
information. While only two thirds of the simulators were detected as malingering using
the M-FAST total score or TSI validity scales, nearly 90% were identified when these
measures were utilized together. This study demonstrated the incremental validity of
using multiple forms of malingering detection for PTSD research but the results still
need to be validated with a true PTSD population.
Purposes and Hypotheses
The importance of assessing malingering in PTSD evaluations has been
demonstrated (e.g., Resnick, 1997) and it has been established that individuals who
undergo such assessments are not likely to be naive to symptoms or psychological
validity scales (Rogers, 1997). Nevertheless, there has been little empirical investigation
into the impact that traumatic life experiences and coaching might have on an
individual’s ability to successfully malinger posttraumatic symptomatology (i.e., present
with symptoms while avoiding detection).
For this study, a 2 x 2 (trauma history x coaching) design was employed. All
respondents were asked to feign PTSD symptomatology, so all were attempting to
malinger. A control group (comprised of honest responders) was not ultilized due to the
homogeneity of such a sample in this author’s previous research (Guriel et al., in press).
Independent variables were trauma experience history (presence or absence) and
coaching (information provided or participants remained naive). Participants were
divided into four groups. Two of the groups were comprised of individuals who reported
having experienced a traumatic event. Those in the first group were not provided with
coaching information and were labeled “trauma positive, naive.” The second group
included those who reported a trauma history and received coaching information. They
were referred to as “trauma positive, coached.” Participants in the third and fourth
conditions reported a negative trauma history (i.e., never experienced an event that
satisfied PTSD criterion A1). As in the trauma positive groups, half were provided with
coaching information and half were not. These participants were classified as “trauma
negative, coached” and “trauma negative, naive,” respectively.
This study was the first to examine trauma history as an independent variable in
feigned PTSD. Furthermore, traditional coaching methods were expanded upon by the
inclusion of both symptom-specific information and strategies for avoiding detection by
validity indices. The study was designed to empirically answer the following research
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questions. When participants are presented with an instructional set and instructed to
malinger:
(1) Are there differences between those who have experienced a PTSD criterion A-1
traumatic event (i.e., experienced the trauma and those who have never experienced
trauma in terms of:
A. the ability to present a valid clinical profile consistent with a PTSD diagnosis on a
general multi-scale self-report inventory (PAI)?
B. the ability to present a valid clinical profile consistent with a PTSD diagnosis on a
trauma-specific multi-scale self-report inventory (TSI)?
C. The ability to avoid detection during a malingering assessment interview
(MFAST)?
(2) Furthermore, does coaching of symptom descriptions and strategies to avoid
detection of malingering affect:
A. the ability to present a valid clinical profile consistent with a PTSD diagnosis on a
general multi-scale self-report inventory (PAI)?
B. the ability to present a valid clinical profile consistent with a PTSD diagnosis on a
trauma-specific multi-scale self-report inventory (TSI)?
C. The ability to avoid detection during a malingering assessment interview
(MFAST)?

Since there is not a single profile that is generally believed to indicate PTSD on
either the PAI or the TSI, the following operational definitions were used for the
purposes of this study. For the PAI, clinical elevation was defined as having PTSD
suggested in the diagnostic constellation of the computerized scoring report and
presenting with a score above 70 (i.e., two standard deviations above the mean) on the
Anxiety Related Disorders, Trauma (ARD-T) scale. For the TSI, clinical elevation was
defined as elevation at least one and a half standard deviations above the mean (i.e.,
65 or above) on at least two scales. In order to be considered valid, a PAI or TSI profile
must not have included a significant (as defined by each measure’s guidelines1)
elevation on any one of the validity scales.
To maximize internal validity, a knowledge-based quiz was administered prior to
the completion of the measures on which participants were asked to malinger. This quiz
assessed the information comprehended by participants during the coaching video. It
was expected that participants in the naive groups would score lower than people in the
coached groups on the quiz. Coached individuals were predicted to score higher than
naive participants, primarily because the coached participants were required to pass the
test with a score of 90% or better, while the non-coached individuals did not have a
requisite minimum score for the quiz. In fact, naive participants who scored above 90 on
the quiz, however, were to be excluded from further participation based on the
assumption that their high scores may reflect knowledge of PTSD that would render a
label of naive invalid for them. None of the naive participants scored above 90 on the
quiz.
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Since the MFAST has accurately differentiated between honest and malingered
responses in the past (Miller et al., 2000), it was expected that those in the coached
groups would earn lower scores (i.e., be less likely to be classified as malingering) than
those in the naive groups. It was still predicted, however, that MFAST scores would be
suggestive of malingering (i.e., MFAST total score > 5) for the majority of respondents.
This prediction was based on the research of Guriel et al. (in press), in which there was
a demonstrated tendency for nearly all participants asked to malinger PTSD to earn
scores of above six on the MFAST.
Participants in the trauma positive and coaching groups (i.e., all except trauma
negative, naive participants) were predicted to present elevated TSI and PAI clinical
profiles. Hypotheses concerning elevated PAI and TSI profiles were based on the
previously summarized findings of Liljequist et al. (1998), Calhoun et al. (2000), and
Edens et al. (1998). It was also hypothesized, however, that those who are classified
as “trauma positive” but did not receive coaching would present elevated validity scale
profiles on the TSI, suggesting that they were feigning their reported symptoms. This
would be consistent with the notion that even legitimate PTSD sufferers tend to present
with seemingly overreported profiles (e.g., Elhai et al., 2001). Furthermore, it was
anticipated that naive malingerers would be detected as malingering via their elevated
scores on the PAI negative impression management and malingering index scales
(based on Liljequist et al.).
Method
Participants
113 undergraduate students from a major Mid-Atlantic university participated in
this study. Fifty-four percent of the overall sample was female and 93% of all
respondents were Caucasian. The only recruitment exclusion criterion was having
participated in a similar study the previous spring (also conducted by this author) that
may have familiarized individuals with the measures being used in this study.
Participants were asked about this at the beginning of the session and were asked to
leave before beginning in the event that they had participated in the aforementioned
study.
Participants were divided on the basis of their experience with traumatic events
(as defined by the PTSD diagnostic criterion A1 in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994). Some
people who experience a traumatic event do not experience acute peritraumatic
distress, whereas others have intense negative emotional reactions at the time the
event (Bernat et al., 1998). Because PTSD has been shown to develop (or not manifest)
in both cases, simply experiencing a traumatic event was used as an operational
definition for trauma positive history in this study. Those who were described as having
experienced a trauma (i.e., trauma positive history) were those who would satisfy PTSD
Criterion A1. Respondents were not required to satisfy Criterion A2 of a PTSD
diagnosis (i.e., experience feelings of fear, helplessness, or horror, or feel concern for
the well being of self or others at the time of the event).
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Participants were divided into four groups according to trauma (positive or
negative history of experiencing a traumatic event, as measured by the Posttraumatic
Stress Diagnostic Scale [PDS; Foa, 1995]) followed by random assignment into
coached or naive conditions. Groups one and two were comprised of individuals who
reported having experienced a traumatic event. Those in group one were not provided
with coaching information and were labeled “trauma positive, naive.” The second group
included those who reported a trauma history and received coaching information. They
were referred to as “trauma positive, coached.” Participants in the third and fourth
conditions reported a negative trauma history (i.e., never experienced an event that
satisfied PTSD criterion A1). As in the trauma positive groups, half were provided with
coaching information and half were not. These participants were classified as “trauma
negative, coached” and “trauma negative, naive,” respectively.
All procedures were conducted with the approval of the West Virginia University
Institutional Review Board (IRB). See IRB approved (HS# 15285) consent form in
Appendix A.
Measures
Coaching Stimuli.
Coaching stimuli consisted of video taped presentation (approximately 15
minutes long) of information obtained from three sources: (a) information about PTSD
and psychological test-taking strategies obtained from internet sites targeted for
attorney use; (b) DSM-IV (APA, 1994) diagnostic criteria (presented in lay terms as
translated by the author); and (c) specific strategies for avoiding detection as a
malingerer as presented by Rogers et al. (1993). The videotape was a lecture-like
format by a university professor using visual aids to present the aforementioned
information. The naive groups viewed a video of equal length, but unrelated to
malingering or PTSD. This was shown to control for equivalent time commitments in the
naive conditions. This video showed the same professor lecturing on jobs for
psychology graduates. In addition to viewing the videotape, participants were also
provided with a handout summarizing the information presented. Handouts for the
coached and naive groups can be found in Appendices B and C, respectively.
Quiz (knowledge test)
A quiz, developed by the author based on information included in the coaching
stimuli, was administered following the video. (See Appendix D). This quiz was
administered to all participants for purposes of comparing learning in the coached
groups to base knowledge of PTSD symptoms and psychological test methodology in
the naive groups. The quiz utilized a recall format and required participants to list, at
minimum, the following PTSD diagnostic criteria: (1) trauma, (2) re-experiencing, (3)
arousal, and (4) avoidance. The acronym BOSS was used to remind coached
participants to avoid endorsing bizarre, obvious, stereotypical, or severe symptoms and,
to pass the quiz, coached simulators had to list all four. If participants initially failed the
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quiz, they were given additional time and were instructed to study from the handouts,
provided by the author, summarizing the information presented in the video. They then
had to re-take the quiz. This happened with only two respondents in the coached
groups.
Malingering Instructional Set.
All participants were instructed to malinger and were provided with the following
instructional set:

“For the remainder of the time that you are here, you are going
to be asked to pretend that you were involved in a serious car accident.
You had no emotional problems because of the trauma,
but you are trying to pretend that you are suffering from
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
in order to get money in a lawsuit. Pretend that you could gain
a lot of money (thousands to over a million dollars!!!)
if you win your lawsuit. Pretend that your lawyer has
sent you to have a psychological evaluation
and that you will be taking
some tests to see if you have PTSD.
Please pretend that you have PTSD as you answer
all of the questions that will be asked of you on these tests.
Answer as you think someone with PTSD would answer.”
While the Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale was used for screening
purposes, all other psychological assessment instruments were utilized to obtain
dependant variables. Detailed scale descriptions and psychometric information for each
measure can be found in their respective manuals. Conventional cutoff scores (i.e.,
those recommended by the respective manuals) were utilized for all measures and
scales with the exception of the TSI ATR scale. A cutoff of T>61 suggests malingering
was used for that scale based on the findings of Edens et al. (1998).
Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale2 (PDS; Foa, 1995).
The PDS is a 49-item, individually administered, self-report screening instrument
for adults. PDS items are based on DSM-IV (APA, 1994) PTSD diagnostic criteria. The
PDS was designed to assist in diagnosis as well as to quantify symptom severity and
functional impairment. Sensitivity (i.e., 82% of PTSD cases were correctly identified)
and specificity (i.e., the absence of PTSD was correctly identified in 76.7% of sample
cases) have both been demonstrated in PDS standardization (Foa, 1995). For the
purposes of this study, the PDS was used as a screening measure to determine
participants’ trauma history status.
Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test (MFAST; Miller, 2001).
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The MFAST is a brief, structured interview designed to detect malingering via
assessment of an individual’s general response style. The MFAST consists of a total
score and seven subscale scores. Total scores higher than five on the MFAST are
suggestive of a dishonest response style. Preliminary MFAST validation studies
revealed excellent sensitivity (1.00) and specificity (.93) using a 51% malingering base
rate (Miller, 2001).The MFAST was utilized to assess the test’s efficacy in correctly
identifying malingering when coaching and trauma history challenges are present.
Trauma Symptom Inventory (TSI) (Briere, 1995).
The TSI is an objective, 100-item self-report, multiscale instrument designed to
assess psychological symptoms commonly associated with traumatic experiences
(Briere, 1995). All TSI items are presented in a four-point, Likert-type format ranging
from never to often. The TSI contains ten clinical and three validity scales, each with Tscores more than one and a half standard deviations above the mean (T > 65)
suggestive of clinical elevation. High internal consistency has been demonstrated with
the TSI, with the median alpha coefficient for all scales at .86 (Briere, 1995).
Discriminant function analysis revealed that all TSI scales were associated with PTSD
and that an optimally weighted combination of TSI scales yielded a positive predictive
power of 92% and a negative predictive power of 91%. The TSI was used here in an
attempt to collect more data to better understand the strengths and limitations of this
relatively new measure of trauma symptomatology.
Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) (Morey, 1991).
The PAI is a multiscale, objective personality inventory containing a total of 22
non-overlapping clinical, treatment, interpersonal, and validity scales (Morey, 1991).
The PAI is comprised of 344 items, each scored on a four-point, Likert-type scale (not at
all true to very true). All PAI scales use a T-score profile system. Elevations more than
two standard deviations above the mean (T > 70) are considered significantly elevated.
Initial validation revealed that the overall psychometric properties of the PAI are sound,
with a median alpha for the clinical and validity scales being .81 (Morey). More
specifically, alpha coefficients for the anxiety related disorders (ARD) scale and ARDtrauma subscale are .76 and .81, respectively (Morey). The PAI was included because
of its growing use in both inpatient and outpatient psychological assessment.
Procedures
Recruitment and Screening.
Participants were recruited via television advertisement, memos posted at the
university, and from undergraduate psychology courses. (See advertisement in
Appendix E). Participants were invited to participate in a one- to two-hour research
study to earn extra course credit with the potential to earn up to $50.00 via the cash
lottery. Interested persons called or emailed the author to schedule a participation
appointment.
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Laboratory Participation Phase.
The laboratory phase was conducted within the psychology department on the
campus of a major mid-Atlantic university. The procedure was similar with regard to
time and effort required of each participant. Participation duration was approximately
two hours. Each student received extra course credit points for participation. Although
participants were told that only “successful malingerers” would be eligible for an
additional cash prize (i.e., cash prize was used as an incentive), all who participated
were entered into a lottery for one of four $50.00 cash prizes. Winners came to claim
their prize, in cash, from the author. Each was provided with a receipt.
The laboratory phase consisted of six distinct tasks: (1) explanation of study and
provision of informed consent; (2) completion of the Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
Diagnostic Scale [PDS]; (3) viewing of a videotaped presentation (either coaching
instructions or the time-matched, irrelevant substitute); (3) successful completion of the
quiz (i.e., internal validity check to ensure that coached participants attended to the
coaching stimuli); (4) completion of the Trauma Symptom Inventory (TSI); (5)
completion of the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI); and (6) Participation in the
Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test (MFAST) interview. Tasks four through
six were counterbalanced to minimize order effects. Specifically, an equal number of
participants from each group completed the M-FAST, TSI, or PAI first, second, or third
with the other two tests alternated to include all six possible order combinations.
For the purpose of group assignment, all prospective participants were assessed
to determine whether they met PTSD criterion A1 (i.e., experienced a traumatic event).
This was done via the Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale (PDS; Foa, 1995). All
participants completed at least a portion of the PDS. If an individual satisfied PTSD
criterion A1 (based on their answers to the initial question set), the measure was
completed in the usual manner to further assess for trauma-related symptomatology.
Individuals who did not satisfy PTSD criterion A (i.e., answered “no” to all events in the
initial question set) did not complete PDS questions about symptom presence or
severity or impairment. After completing the PDS, participants were randomly assigned
to either the informed or naive coaching conditions.
Participation occurred in a small group format and was coordinated by the author
with the assistance of two undergraduate research assistants. Participants provided
consent, completed the PDS, viewed the videotape, and completed self-report
measures in the group format. MFAST interviews were conducted individually in an
adjacent room within the laboratory proper. Occasionally, the M-FAST interviewer may
have been aware of the participant’s trauma history or coaching status. For this reason,
it cannot be said that interviewers were masked to independent variable conditions.
Following completion of all tasks participants were provided with extra credit
slips. Cash lottery prizes were awarded after each quarter of the data had been
collected (i.e., one prize was awarded after 25% of the data were collected, another
after 50%, etc.).
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Planned Analyses
Data collected from this 2 x2 design (trauma exposure x coaching) was analyzed
using SPSS software (version 11). Each of the four groups was compared to one
another on the following categories of dependent measures: (1) PAI clinical and validity
sale scores, (2) TSI clinical and validity scale scores, and (3) MFAST total and subscale
scores. Multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) were used for continuous data,
while Pearson’s Chi2 analyses3 were conducted for dichotomous variables. Data were
analyzed for main effects and interactions. To determine if several important
demographic characteristics, including type of trauma experienced and frequency and
severity of reported symptoms (where applicable) had an impact on the results,
MANOVA and Pearson’s Chi2 analyses were performed on these data as well.
Variables analyzed in this manner included: (1) PDS diagnosis (presence or absence of
PTSD), severity, and impairment; (2) Demographic variables; and (3) nature (i.e., what
type) and time (i.e., how long ago) of traumatic event. If omnibus differences emerged,
subsequent Analyses of Covariance (ANCOVAs) were to be performed.
Specific analyses are described below:
To test the hypothesis that trauma positive participants would score higher than
trauma negative participants on subscale ARD-T of the PAI, the percentage of those
above T = 70 were compared to the percentage of those below T = 70 using a
Pearson’s Chi2 analysis. To test the hypothesis that trauma positive participants would
be suggested for an Axis I PTSD diagnosis by the PAI interpretive report more often
than would trauma negative participants, the percentage of those who had PTSD
suggested in the diagnostic constellation was compared to the percentage of those who
did not have PTSD suggested as a diagnosis using a Pearson’s Chi2 analysis. To test
the hypothesis that trauma positive participants would be more likely than trauma
negative participants to present at least two clinical scale elevations on the TSI, the
percentage of those scoring above T = 65 on at least two clinical scales was compared
to the percentage of those who failed to present at least two clinical scale elevations on
the TSI using a Pearson’s Chi2 analysis.
To test the hypothesis that coached participants would be better able to present with
valid profiles than naive participants on the MFAST, the percentage of those who
scored below 6 on the MFAST total (classified as “honest” responders) was compared
to the percentage of those who scored above 5 on the total score (suggesting
malingering) using a Pearson’s Chi2 analysis. To test the hypothesis that coached
participants would be better able to present with valid profiles than naive participants on
the PAI, the percentage of those who did not present with any validity scale elevations
above suggested cutoffs was compared to the percentage of those who scored above
suggested cutoffs on any of the PAI validity indices (suggesting malingering) using a
Pearson’s Chi2 analysis. To test the hypothesis that coached participants would be
better able to present with valid profiles than naive participants on the TSI, the
percentage of those who failed to present with any validity scale elevations above
suggested cutoffs was compared to the percentage of those who scored above
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suggested cutoffs on any of the TSI validity indices (suggesting malingering) using a
Pearson’s Chi2 analysis.
Furthermore, to test the hypothesis that coached participants would score higher
than naive participants on subscale ARD-T of the PAI, the percentage of those who
scored above T = 70 was compared to the percentage of those who scored below T =
70 using a Pearson’s Chi2 analysis. To test the hypothesis that coached participants
would be suggested for an Axis I PTSD diagnosis by PAI scoring interpretation more
often than would naive participants, the percentage of those who had PTSD suggested
in the diagnostic constellation was compared to the percentage of those who did not
have PTSD suggested as a diagnosis using a Pearson’s Chi2 analysis. To test the
hypothesis that coached participants would be more likely than naive participants to
present with at least two clinical scale elevations on the TSI, the percentage of those
who scored above T = 65 on at least two clinical scales was compared to the
percentage of those who failed to present at least two clinical scale elevations on the
TSI using a Pearson’s Chi2 analysis. Finally, the Eta2 correlation ratio was used to
assess the strength of the experimental effect by controlling to error and bias.
Results
Results of Demographic Data
Simulators (N = 113) were undergraduate students enrolled in psychology
courses (n = 31 trauma positive, coached, n = 35 trauma positive, naive, n = 25 trauma
negative, coached, and n = 22 trauma negative, naive). Fifty-four percent of the overall
sample was female and the majority (93%) of all respondents were Caucasian. No
differences were found on demographic variables and randomly assigned coaching
status, so demographic data did not impact later parametric or nonparametric analyses.
Results of Trauma History Data
The Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale (PDS) was used to confirm trauma
experience history. Those who endorsed experiencing at least one traumatic event on
the PDS were considered to be trauma positive. To be labeled trauma negative, a
respondent must have endorsed no traumatic event experience on either the
demographic or PDS screeners.
For those who were trauma positive, PDS symptom and severity answers were
recoded and assessed in terms of: (1) the nature of the event, (2) the time frame for
when the event had occurred, (3) whether or not they met criterion B (re-experiencing)
of PTSD diagnostic criteria, (4) whether or not they met criterion C (avoidance) of
PTSD diagnostic criteria, (5) whether or not they met criterion D (arousal) of PTSD
diagnostic criteria, (6) whether or not they met all three criteria (B, C, and D) of PTSD
diagnostic criteria, (7) whether or not they endorsed at least one impairment item to
suggest that their symptoms affected their daily functioning, (8) whether or not the PDS
would be suggestive of PTSD (i.e., meeting all three criteria and having at least one
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area of impairment), and (9) for those who did have PTSD suggested, what the severity
of their symptoms was.
These nine recoded data were then compared to coaching status using
Pearson’s Chi2 analyses. This was done to ensure that there were no differences within
the trauma positive group that might confound subsequent analyses. No differences
were found and it was concluded that trauma positive, coached individuals were not
significantly different from trauma positive, naive participants based on PDS variables.
Of the trauma positive individuals, 41% listed an accident as the event that “bothers you
the most” and six months to three years was the most frequently endorsed time frame
(44%) when asked “how long ago did the traumatic event happen?”
Sixty-one percent of trauma positive, naive participants satisfied criterion B (reexperiencing), while 59% of trauma positive, coached respondents did the same. For
criterion C (avoidance), the percentages of those satisfying diagnostic requirements
were as follows: trauma positive, naive 46% and trauma positive, coached 42%. For
arousal (criterion D), 52% of the trauma positive, naive and 47% of the trauma positive,
coached participants met diagnostic standards. When examining which trauma positive
respondents would meet diagnostic criteria for PTSD (as defined by meeting criteria B,
C, and D and endorsing some level of impairment from these symptoms), 33% of the
naive and 21% of the coached participants were found to be endorsing symptoms which
might warrant a PTSD diagnosis.
In order to determine if differences in severity of PTSD symptoms within the
trauma positive groups were significant, the trauma positive participants were divided
into three groups based on their PDS Total score (determined by adding responses for
all items for which respondents rated their problems [items 22-38]). Those with scores
of 0 to 2 were considered mildly bothered by their symptoms. Those with scores
between 3 and 8 were considered moderate and those with scores above 9 were
labeled as severely disturbed by posttraumatic stress symptoms. For trauma positive,
naive respondents’ classifications, 34% were mild, 23% were moderate, and 43% were
severe. Trauma positive, coached respondents were classified as follows: 45% mild,
39% moderate, and 16% severe. Pearson’s Chi2 analyses were not significant when
comparing these groups.
Interrater Reliability and Internal Validity Analyses
Analyses were conducted to ensure reliable administration of the M-FAST. Interrater reliability was assessed for 10 (across groups and M-FAST administrators) of the
113 M-FAST protocols. To examine inter-rater reliability, the administrator scored the MFAST in the room with the participant, while an independent observer scored the MFAST from behind a one-way mirror. Pearson product moment correlations were
conducted for the M-FAST Total score yielding a perfect inter-rater reliability of 1.0.
Furthermore, every score was a match, yielding absolute scoring agreement.
Furthermore, a Pearson’s Chi2 analysis was conducted to determine whether the

Malingering PTSD 18
M-FAST administrator (there were four different administrators) had any effect on
scores or malingering classification. Although the administrator did affect some
individual scales, who gave the M-FAST interview did not have an impact on the
likelihood for malingering success or the final malingering classification. Because the
assignment of administrators to participants was done in a non-random sequence (i.e.,
there was no attempt to insure that all administrators interviewed equal numbers of
respondents from each group) and because there was perfect inter-rater reliability for
the M-FAST, it is believed that these were spurious differences.
Given that participants were given the TSI, PAI, and M-FAST in a
counterbalanced manner (i.e., one third of the participants in each of the four groups
completed the TSI, M-FAST, or PAI first, second, or third in alternating fashion), no
formal testing for order effects was performed.
Finally, in order to insure that naive simulators did not have any substantial
knowledge of PTSD, their quiz scores were examined. None of these simulators scored
well enough to meet the quiz criteria that the coached participants were held to (e.g.,
scoring 90% or better). More specifically, the highest score quiz from any naive
participant was six (trauma positive, naive M = 2.54, SD = 1.36; trauma negative, naive
M = 1.77, SD = 1.23), whereas the lowest score for any coached individual was ten
(trauma positive, coached M = 10.55, SD = .51; trauma negative, coached M = 10.60,
SD = .50). Therefore, the participants who did not receive coaching were considered
psychiatrically naive, or unfamiliar with PTSD symptomatology, and none had to be
excluded from subsequent analyses.
Analyses of Validity Scales
Validity scale scores for the M-FAST, TSI, and PAI are summarized in Table 1.
Omnibus differences are reported in Table 1, while main effect results for coaching are
summarized in Table 2. Means are shown in Figure 1. There were no main effects for
trauma history or interactions of coaching and trauma history for any of the validity
scales. Multivariate analyses of variance were conducted to examine differences
between groups on all TSI, PAI, and M-FAST validity and total scores. Because there
were unequal numbers of participants in each cell, the general linear model (GLM) was
utilized for all multivariate analyses.
A significant effect was found for the M-FAST total score indicating omnibus
differences among the groups, F(3, 112) = 5.82, p < .01. It is noteworthy that although
the coached participants had lower M-FAST Total scores than did the naive simulators,
mean scores for all four groups were above the M-FAST cutoff (5), indicating that
malingering would have been suggested by the M-FAST for most respondents. This
indicates that the M-FAST was effective in correctly classifying malingerers, even when
presented with a coaching challenge.
Significant omnibus differences also occurred for TSI Atypical Responding (ATR)
and Response Level (RL) validity scale scores: F(3, 112) = 9.59, p < .001, and F(3, 112)
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= 6.76, p < .001, respectively. There were no omnibus differences for the TSI
Inconsistency (INC) scale. Coached simulators produced lower group mean scores than
naive participants on the TSI ATR scale, F(1, 112) = 27.57, p < .001, suggesting those
who received information about PTSD and psychological validity indices were less likely
to report atypical PTSD symptoms than were those who did not have access to this
information. On the TSI RL scale, on the other hand, naive respondents had lower
group means than did the coached participants, F(1, 112) = 17.39, p < .001.
For the PAI validity scales, omnibus differences were present for the Negative
Impression Management, F(3, 112) = 8.03, p < .001, Positive Impression Management,
F(3, 112) = 7.40, p < .001, and Malingering Index, F(3, 112) = 6.30, p < .001, scales. No
omnibus differences emerged for the PAI Inconsistency or Infrequency scales. Coached
simulators scored lower than naive participants on the NIM and MI scales: [F(1, 112) =
23.06, p < .001 and F(1, 112) = 18.06, p < .001]. Naive respondents had lower group
mean scores than coached, however, on the PAI PIM scale, F(1, 112) = 17.18, p < .001.
Analyses of TSI Clinical Scales
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to examine
differences with regard to the TSI clinical scales. Overall differences were detected for
coaching, F(3, 112) = 3.842, p < .001 (Eta2 = .340), but not for trauma or the interaction
of coaching and trauma. Omnibus differences are reported in Table 3 and means are
displayed in Figure 2. Significant omnibus differences were found for all ten TSI clinical
scales. Furthermore, subsequent One-way Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) revealed
that for each of the TSI clinical scales, coached participants produced significantly lower
group means than did naive simulators. Main effect results for TSI clinical scales by
coaching are shown in Table 4. No main effects for trauma history or interactions were
found. This indicates that not only did coaching lead to lower TSI clinical elevations but
also that trauma history did not have any impact on TSI clinical scores.
In order to compare how likely groups were to have significantly elevated TSI
clinical scales, data were recoded and categorized as either above or below clinical
cutoffs (T=65). The percentage of those who produced elevations in the coached group
was then compared the percentage of those who produced elevations in the naive
group using Pearson’s Chi2 analyses. These results are summarized in Table 5.
Consistent with the TSI main effects results, a lower percentage of those in the
coached group had TSI clinical scale elevations than did naive simulators for the
following clinical scales: Anxious Arousal, Depression, Anger/Irritability, Intrusive
Experiences, Defensive Avoidance, Dissociation, Sexual Concerns, Impaired SelfReference, and Tension Reduction Behavior. The same procedure was repeated to
compare those in the trauma positive and trauma negative groups but no differences
were present for these comparisons. (See Table 6).
Analyses of PAI Clinical, Treatment, and Interpersonal Scales
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A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was also conducted to examine
differences with regard to PAI clinical, treatment, and interpersonal scales. Similar to the
TSI results, overall differences were detected for coaching, F(3, 112) = 2.047, p < .01
(Eta2 = .364), but not for trauma or the interaction of coaching and trauma. These results
can be found in Table 7 and means can be seen in Figure 3. No omnibus differences
were detected for PAI Alcohol Problems or Drug Problems clinical scales, Treatment
Rejection treatment scale, or Dominance or Warmth interpersonal scales. Differences
were present for all other scales: Somatic Complaints, Anxiety, Anxiety Related
Disorders, Anxiety Related Disorders, Trauma Subscale, Depression, Mania, Paranoia,
Schizophrenia, Borderline Features, Antisocial Features, Aggression, Suicidal Ideation,
Stress, and Nonsupport.
Corresponding ANOVAs revealed that for each of the following PAI clinical
scales, coached participants had significantly lower group mean scores than did naive
simulators: Somatic Complaints, Anxiety, Anxiety Related Disorders, Anxiety Related
Disorders, Trauma Subscale, Depression, Mania, Paranoia, Schizophrenia, Borderline
Features, Antisocial Features, Alcohol Problems, Drug Problems, Aggression, Suicidal
Ideation, Stress, and Nonsupport. Naive participants had lower group means than did
coached students on the PAI Warmth interpersonal scale. No main effects for trauma
or interactions were found for any of the PAI clinical, treatment, or interpersonal scales.
In order to compare how likely groups were to have significantly elevated PAI
clinical scales, data were recoded and categorized as either above or below clinical
cutoffs (T=70). The percentage of those who produced elevations in the coached group
was then compared the percentage of those who produced elevations in the naive
group using Pearson’s Chi2 analyses. These results are summarized in Table 9. Similar
to the PAI main effects results, naive participants were generally more likely than
coached simulators to have elevated responses on several PAI clinical, treatment, and
interpersonal scales.
No differences were found for the Mania or Antisocial clinical scales or for the
Treatment Rejection treatment scale or the Dominance or Warmth interpersonal scales.
Differences were present for all other scales: Somatic Complaints, Anxiety, Anxiety
Related Disorders, Anxiety Related Disorders, Trauma Subscale, Depression, Paranoia,
Schizophrenia, Borderline Features, Alcohol Problems, Drug Problems, Aggression,
Suicidal Ideation, Stress, and Nonsupport.
The same procedure was repeated to compare the elevations for those in the
trauma positive and trauma negative groups. Again consistent with PAI main effects
results, there were no differences in the likelihood that trauma positive or trauma
negative participants produced elevated PAI clinical, treatment, and interpersonal
scales and no interactions were significant. See Table 10. It can be concluded, then,
that trauma history did not impact the occurrence of PAI elevations.
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Analyses of M-FAST Total Score and Subscales
Like the TSI and PAI, a MANOVA with follow-up ANOVAs was used to detect
group mean differences on the M-FAST. Again, overall differences for coaching were
revealed for coaching, F(3, 112) = 3.969, p < .001 (Eta2 = .237), but not for trauma or
the interaction of coaching and trauma. Omnibus differences were found for the MFAST Total score, F(3, 112) = 5.82, p < .01. Differences were also shown for the
following M-FAST subscales: Reported/Observed, Extreme Symptomatology, Rare
Symptom Combination, Unusual Hallucinations, Negative Self-image, and
Suggestibility. There were no between-groups differences for the M-FAST Unusual
Symptom Course subscale. Main effects revealed that coached simulators produced
lower group mean scores than naive participants on each of the M-Fast Total and
subscales Reported/Observed, Extreme Symptomatology, Rare Symptom Combination,
Unusual Hallucinations, Negative Self-image, and Suggestibility. No main effects for
trauma or interactions were significant for any of the M-FAST scales. See Tables 11
and 12 and Figure 4.
Analyses of Malingering Detection
The primary purpose of this study was to compare the ability of participants to
malinger PTSD. In order to conduct this comparison, simulators had to be categorized
by malingering status. Because, in clinical practice a successful malingerer would
present with an honest response style and clinically significant elevation to suggest
psychological distress, successful malingering was narrowly defined. First, no elevated
validity scales were allowed because these could lead a clinician to conclude that a
respondent was malingering. Therefore, validity scale scores on all tests were required
to be below clinical cutoffs. Given the paucity of research on the M-FAST subscales,
only the M-FAST Total score was used for this categorization. Secondly, if no clinical
elevations were present, then an evaluator would be unlikely to label someone as
having PTSD. Without any symptoms, there could be no impairment as required by
diagnostic criteria. Because the TSI lacks specific cutoffs for consideration of PTSD, a
clinically elevated profile was operationally defined as two or more clinical scale
elevations. Two criteria were utilized for indicating PTSD symptomatology via the PAI:
(1) elevation on the trauma subscale of the Anxiety Related Disorders clinical scale
(“ARDT”), and (2) PTSD suggested as an Axis I diagnosis by the computer scored PAI
interpretive report.
In summary, successful malingering was operationally defined by the following
criteria: (1) no elevations on M-FAST total score; (2) no elevations on TSI ATR, INC, or
RL scales; (3) no elevations on PAI INC, INF, NIM, PIM, or MI, scales; (4) at least two
elevations on TSI clinical scales [represented by variable “TSI PTSD”]; (5) an elevated
PAI ARDT scale; and (6) PTSD suggested as an Axis I diagnosis by PAI interpretive
report [represented by variable “PAI PTSD”]. If all of these criteria were satisfied, a
participant was labeled as a successful malingerer. This occurred with only four
individuals (3.5%) in the entire sample (N=113). Therefore, 97% of participants were
accurately classified as malingering.
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To evaluate these criteria, scores for all involved scales had to be recoded in a
manner similar to that used with the TSI and PAI clinical scales for categorization as
either above or below clinical cutoffs. The percentage of those who produced elevations
in the coached groups was then compared the percentage of those who produced
elevations in the naive groups and this was repeated for the trauma positive and
negative groups using Pearson’s Chi2 analyses. Results are summarized in Tables 13
and 14, respectively. The percentages of malingering success or failure rates can be
seen in Figures 4 and 5.
When looking at coaching status, a pattern of coached participants presenting
with a lower percentage of elevations than naive simulators emerged for each of the
following variables: M-FAST Total, TSI ATR, TSI PTSD, PAI ARDT, PAI NIM, PAI MI,
and PAI PTSD. The opposite (coached>naive) occurred for TSI RL. All Chi2 values are
shown in Table 13. There were no differences in the percentages of clinical elevations
by coaching status for the TSI INC, PAI INC, PAI INF, or PAI PIM scales. No differences
emerged for any of the aforementioned variables when trauma positive and negative
groups were compared.
Simulators who failed to meet the malingering criteria were categorized by what
aspect of the data prevented their success. For example, participants who were
unsuccessful malingerers were divided into two categories: (1) those who had invalid
response styles as evidenced by one or more validity scale elevations, and (2) those
who presented with a valid profile but failed to have clinical elevation suggesting
requisite psychological distress. These three groups (i.e., successful, unsuccessful
because invalid, and unsuccessful because no elevation; this variable was labeled
“malingering status”) were then compared with one another using Pearson’s Chi2
analyses. As with TSI and PAI Chi2 analyses, these malingering groups were compared
based on coaching status and trauma history. Results are summarized in Tables 13
and 14, respectively.
A difference was present for malingering status by coaching, χ2(1, 112) = 8.24, p
< .05, suggesting that coached participants were more likely to be successful
malingerers than were naive respondents. The pattern of proportion of successful:
unsuccessful because invalid: unsuccessful because no elevation, however, was similar
for the coached and naive groups. Specifically, the majority of individuals in each group
(77% for coached and 95% for naive) were unsuccessful malingerers because they
presented with at least one elevated validity scale. Although no differences were
present for malingering status by trauma history, the same pattern was repeated there
as well.
To examine the unsuccessful malingerers on a more detailed level, all possible
combinations of reasons for being unsuccessful were explored. Differences were found
for coaching [χ2(1, 112) = 26.88, p < .01] but not for trauma. It was shown that the most
common reason for individuals to be unsuccessful due to presenting with invalid profiles
was that they had elevations on at least one validity scale on all three (M-FAST, TSI,
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and PAI) instruments (32% for coached, 68% for naive, 50% for trauma positive, and
51% for trauma negative participants). The specifics of all other unsuccessful
percentages can be found as “Detailed Malingering Status” in Tables 13 and 14.
Individual Scale Analyses
Finally, in an attempt to determine the effectiveness of validity scales at
identifying malingered responses, all of the aforementioned recoded validity indices
were examined across coaching and trauma groups. Because all participants were
attempting to malinger, perfect detection rates would be 100% for each scale. The MFAST total score, PAI NIM, TSI ATR, PAI MI scales were the most effective in correctly
classifying simulators. These scales, when analyzed independently, correctly
categorized 68%, 59%, 58%, and 55% of simulators, respectively. The PAI INF scale
accurately classified 23% of simulators. The TSI INC scale correctly labeled 13%, while
the PAI INC scale categorized 9.7%. The TSI RL only identified 3.5% of feigners and
the PAI PIM scale did not classify any respondent as malingering. Clearly, false
negative rates (i.e., a lack of validity scale elevation with simulated responses) are of
concern with each of these indices when analyzed independently.
Discussion
Summary of Results
This is one of the few studies to employ a coaching design in PTSD simulation
research. It is also the first to examine the potential impact of trauma history on feigning
posttraumatic stress symptoms. Overall, this investigation demonstrated that providing
simulators with diagnostic information on PTSD symptoms and strategies for avoiding
detection on psychological validity indices (i.e., coaching) was effective in assisting
simulators with presenting as if they were experiencing but not significantly
exaggerating posttraumatic stress symptoms. This was manifest in group mean
differences between coached and naive respondents on several validity and clinical
scales across measures. Trauma history, on the other hand, did not impact simulators
ability to feign PTSD symptoms in any meaningful way. Participants who experienced a
traumatic event were not better able to feign PTSD than were those without any history
of experiencing or witnessing a traumatic event. Furthermore, a positive trauma history
did not mediate the exaggerated clinical presentation commonly seen with PTSD
simulation research (e.g., Liljequist et al., 1998). Also, no interactions between
coaching and trauma history were detected, suggesting that coaching, alone, accounted
for these differences.
Coached participants had lower group mean scores and rates of being above
clinical cutoffs than did naive simulators for the M-FAST Total, TSI ATR scale, and PAI
NIM and MI scales. Despite these differences, coached participants were still not
significantly better at avoiding malingering detection than were naive simulators. No
differences were found between coached and naive simulators for the TSI INC, PAI
INC, or PAI INF scales. Specifically, naive and coached feigners were equally able to
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present relatively consistent clinical profiles without endorsing different rates of
symptoms so rare they are not often endorsed, even by persons with legitimate
pathology. This is an important finding because an inconsistent profile can be a
hallmark for suggesting malingering and few of these simulators would have been
detected in this manner.
Mean scores for all four groups were above the M-FAST cutoff (5), indicating that
malingering would have been suggested by the M-FAST for over two thirds of all
respondents. This provides evidence that the M-FAST can be an effective screening
tool for malingering detection when PTSD symptoms are being presented. These
results are consistent with previous research in which a coaching challenge was used
with the M-FAST (e.g., Guriel et al., in press).
Despite the differences between the coached and naive participants on validity
and clinical scales, 97% of all simulators were correctly classified as malingering. Even
respondents who were provided with PTSD symptom information and strategies for
avoiding detection via psychological validity indices were no more successful in
malingering PTSD than those who were given no such information. It should be
acknowledged that using lower cut scores on M-FAST total or TSI or PAI subscales
could increase the sensitivity of each measure in the detection of malingered PTSD. In
clinical practice, however, this would also yield decreased specificity (i.e., higher false
positive rates).
Presenting with elevated validity indicators was the most common reason
participants were classified as unsuccessful feigners (77% for the coached groups and
95% for the naive). This is a testament to the inclusion of measures of response style
within multiscale, self-report assessment measures.
These results support the idea of using a multi-method assessment approach
when conducting forensic PTSD evaluations (e.g., Guriel & Fremouw, 2003). By
combining a malingering specific interview with multi-scale inventories of posttraumatic
and related clinical symptoms, clinicians may be able to correctly classify a large
percentage of all feigning clients. This provides a useful framework from which forensic
PTSD assessment might be effectively approached.
Limitations
Although this is one of the few studies to employ a coaching design in PTSD
simulation research, several limitations must be acknowledged. First, this relatively
small, homogeneous sample of college students provides limited generalizability. A
larger, more heterogeneous sample, particularly of persons diagnosed with PTSD, may
yield different results. Utilizing such a clinical comparison group may also account for
the differences in test results between coached and naive groups. One way to test this
would be to employ a mixed group validation procedure (i.e., validation groups are
comprised of both individuals with and without pathology) as suggested by Frederick
(2000). In addition to using a known PTSD group, comparison of simulators to a known
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malingering group (as identified by the Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms
[SIRS; Rogers, 1992] or a similar measure of response style) would allow for analysis of
the differences between true malingerers and simulators. Similarly, no honest
responders were included in this study. This type of control group would provide a
baseline of response for which comparison to the simulation groups could be made.
Also, it is possible that there was at least some degree of experimenter bias because
the examiners were aware that all participants were being asked to malinger.
No attempt was made to verify participants’ self-reported trauma history. As a
result, it is possible that some of the trauma positive respondents did not actually
experience traumatic events. Likewise, trauma negative individuals could have
experienced an event that was not reported. Verification of the reported trauma should
be attempted whenever possible, particularly in true clinical or forensic settings
(Pankratz, 2003). Even those who reported experiencing a traumatic event were
relatively unlikely to endorse clinically significant impairment as a result of the trauma
(as measured by the PDS screener; 26% for naive and 9% for coached respondents).
This might indicate that these traumatic events were not particularly salient for
respondents or that enough time had elapsed since the event (44% reported 6 months
to 3 years) for posttraumatic symptoms to remit without intervention. Requiring
participants to have fulfilled both criteria A1 and A2 (experiencing the event and feeling
fear, helplessness, or horror, or concern for the well being of self or others at the time of
the event) may have yielded different results for these trauma positive individuals.
In addition to the coaching instructional set, extra course credit and the chance at
a $50 cash prize lottery were used as incentives for successful malingering. This
methodology is similar to that of others who have used students with simulation designs
(e.g., Edens et al., 1998; Liljequist et al., 1998; Storm & Graham, 2000). Still, these
incentives are not an equivalent to more realistic settings in which incentives might
include such salient reinforcers as lifetime disability benefits, public notoriety, or large
financial settlements. The relative lack of incentive may have affected the motivation of
participants, potentially resulting in a lower effort being put forth than what would be
expected in a bona fide litigation situation. For a detailed discussion of the limitations of
using coaching in simulation designs with a relative lack of incentives, see Rogers and
Cruise (1998).
Also, though the coaching material was ecologically valid because part of it was
obtained from the internet, a medium easily available to many PTSD litigants, the
overall degree of coaching (approximately 15 minutes) was likely less than what would
be found in a situation where respondents were more motivated to present with a PTSD
profile. Tan, Slick, Strauss, and Hultsch (2002) caution that motivated malingerers do
have access to information helpful to feigning psychopathology. More specifically,
Wetter and Corrigan (1995) found that nearly 50% of attorneys and law students feel
that they have a responsibility to inform their clients of the validity scales on
psychological tests. It is unclear, however, how many actually provide their clients with
any information about psychological assessments.
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This is the one of the few studies to use PTSD symptom coaching with the PAI
(Calhoun et al., 2000; Liljequist et al., 1998; Scragg et al., 2000). Given that these
studies used different levels and methods of coaching and different cutoff scores for
validity indices, further investigation is warranted before the implications of such results
can be extended outside a research context. Furthermore, this is the first study to use
validity scale coaching with the PAI. Most have involved the MMPI-2 (Bury & Bagby,
2002; Lamb et al., 1994; Rogers et al., 1993; Storm & Graham, 2000). The MMPI-2
validity scale coaching research has been inconsistent, making generalizations
inappropriate and further investigation even more necessary. Because only a small
number of empirical studies have tested the effects of validity scale coaching, further
research must be conducted before findings can be generalized to any degree.
Moreover, aside from Edens et al. (1998) and Guriel et al. (in press), few
researchers have employed coached simulation designs with either the M-FAST or the
TSI, so replication and extension are clearly warranted. Because both of these
measures are still being validated, it is important to assess their vulnerability to
challenges such as coaching and trauma history. This may be done by replicating
earlier findings or by expanding the breadth of the results with research conducted by
investigators other than the authors of these measures. It would also be useful to repeat
these investigations with clinical populations including persons diagnosed with PTSD.
Furthermore, investigation into whether using lower cutoff scores for forensic
evaluations (as opposed to presumably less adversarial clinical assessments) would
yield different results would be beneficial.
Although participant knowledge was tested after coaching using a pre-test quiz,
no post-test quiz was administered after completion of the M-FAST, TSI, and PAI. This
leaves open the possibility that participants misunderstood the test instructions or forgot
the coaching information while answering the TSI, PAI, and M-FAST. Inclusion of both
pre- and post-test quizzes may have better addressed this concern. Similarly, assessing
participants’ motivation to feign following completion of all measures could have
provided more empirical evidence of the effort put forth during this simulation study.
Although M-FAST administrators were generally not aware of the coaching or
trauma history status of respondents, it is possible that the M-FAST interviewer may
have been inadvertently aware of this because of their involvement with the entire
laboratory phase process. For this reason, it cannot be said that interviewers were fully
masked to independent variable conditions. Perfect inter-rater reliability on the M-FAST,
however, suggests that his did not affect results. It would have been preferable for MFAST administrators to be completely unaware of trauma history or coaching status.
A further limitation of these results stems from the narrow, conservative definition
of successful malingering used in this study. In order to be labeled a successful
malingerer in this study, a participant had to avoid significant elevation on any of nine
validity scales and present with clinical elevation on both the PAI and TSI. As a result,
this may be overly restrictive in defining malingering in a clinical or forensic setting. For
example, in an evaluation where a clinical interview and behavioral observations were
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afforded a single validity scale elevation may be explained by reasons other than pure
feigning. This is a particular concern since it is difficult to differentiate between
malingered and genuine PTSD because an apparent overreporting of symptoms is
thought to be associated with legitimate PTSD cases (Elhai et al., 2001; Hyer et al.,
1987; Resnick, 1997). This happens because PTSD has a high comorbidity with both
clinical and personality disorders, making differential diagnosis a challenge (Keane,
1995); and because PTSD, like other severe pathologies, may include a number of
symptoms resulting in an elevated overall symptom profile (Hyer et al.).
Finally, as mentioned in the introduction, accurate estimates of the base rates of
malingering are generally not known (Rogers, 1997). Making any comparisons or
statistical estimates is a difficult endeavor when no empirical base rate exists. Further
investigation into the base rates of malingering among PTSD claimants is needed.
Implications and Future Directions
Malingering is a critical issue in the assessment of posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) for several reasons. First, unlike most psychiatric conditions, PTSD requires
that there be a cause and effect relation between a traumatic event and subsequent
psychological sequelae. Given that clinicians are forced to rely heavily on subjective
client self-reports in diagnosing PTSD (because the DSM criteria are dominated by
subjective experiences), it has been argued that PTSD is easily faked (Elhai et al.,
2001; Frueh & Kinder, 1994; Lees-Haley, 1986). In attempting to feign postraumtic
stress symptomatology, clients may completely fabricate their symptoms, exaggerate
the extent of their injuries, or attribute pre-existing symptoms to the current trauma.
Unfortunately, such behaviors are not uncommon (e.g., Resnick, 1997).
Secondly, as previously mentioned, it is difficult to differentiate between
malingered and genuine PTSD because endorsement of many different symptoms may
be reflective of legitimate posttraumatic stress or comorbid Axis I and/or Axis II
psychopathology (e.g., Keane, 1995). People may be motivated to feign PTSD to obtain
financial compensation (McGuire, 1999; Lees-Haley 1992; Resnick, 1997), to receive
treatment or gain inpatient status (e.g., Elhai et al., 2001), to embellish victimization
(e.g., Resnick), or to reduce or avoid criminal liability (e.g., Baer & Miller, 2002; Melton
et al., 1997). Finally, the potentially large incentives (monetary or otherwise) involved
with PTSD claims may serve to increase motivation in a would-be malingerer or even in
someone who would not ordinarily engage in such deceitful behavior.
Coached participants were better able than naive respondents to present as if
they were experiencing but not significantly exaggerating posttraumatic stress
symptoms. Still, they were relatively ineffective at discriminating when to endorse or
avoid symptoms in an attempt to produce a successfully malingered profile. This may
be because the assessment measures used in this study are effective in identifying
feigned psychopathology. It could also be accounted for, however, by the relative
paucity of coaching. More intense, ecologically valid coaching (likely to be sought out by
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more motivated simulators such as would likely be seen practice) may enable more
successful malingerers.
Use of a larger, more heterogeneous sample is also warranted for future
research. It would be especially interesting to compare results on the measures used in
this study for individuals who have experienced a single, time limited traumatic event,
(e.g., one motor vehicle accident) with those who have repeatedly been traumatized
(i.e., multiple events across time) and with those who have experienced a prolonged
victimization (e.g., survivors of years of ongoing physical, sexual, or emotional abuse).
Utilization of different cutoff scores for the scales and indices examined in this
study may also produce different results. Cutoffs different from those suggested in
respective test manuals may yield the best positive and negative predictive power (and
subsequently overall classification rate) for malingering detection. Further research into
this area is strongly encouraged. Results must be well disseminated, however, because
most clinicians are likely to rely on procedures recommended in test manuals unless
they are aware of the utility of alternate procedures.
Analysis of the incremental validity of using these measures alone or in
conjunction with one another may assist clinicians in deciding which assessments to
use and in what order. It may be that using two of the three measures is equally
effective to using all three in discriminating malingered PTSD. It is also possible that
order in which these measures are used could impact the efficacy of identifying
malingered PTSD.
Lastly, this is one of only a few studies to employ a multi-assessment coaching
design in PTSD simulation research and is the first to examine the potential impact of
trauma history on malingered PTSD. Replication and extension are clearly needed.
Similar investigation with other self-report measures of non-combat PTSD such as the
recently validated PTSD Checklist-Civilian Version (see Ruggiero, Del Ben, Scotti, &
Rabalais, 2003) is warranted. Similarly, replication of the coaching paradigm with other
types of PTSD assessment measure (e.g., psychophysiological) are also necessary.
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Appendix A
Institutional Review Board Approved Consent Form
CONSENT AND INFORMATION FORM
Title: Detection of Coached Malingering of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.
Investigators: Jennifer Guriel, M.A., and William Fremouw, Ph.D., West Virginia University
have been invited to
Introduction: I,
participate in this research study, which has been explained to me by __________. I have been
informed that this research is being conducted as a doctoral research project in the Department
of Psychology at West Virginia University.
Purposes of the Study: This study is designed to examine the ability of individuals with and
without a trauma history (e.g., surviving or witnessing a car accident, flood, assault, etc.) to fake
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder when given coached instructions.
Description of Procedures: This study involves answering questionnaires after watching an
instructional film regarding symptoms of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. I will also be asked to
complete questionnaires regarding general psychological symptoms that I may or may not be
experiencing. This procedure will take approximately one to two hours to complete. I
understand that I am not required to answer all questions and that I may view the questions
before signing this consent form if I request to do so. Approximately 125 participants will be
involved in this study. This phase of the study will take place in the laboratory of Dr. William
Fremouw on the downtown campus of West Virginia University.
Risks and Discomforts: There are no known or expected risks from participating in this phase
of the study, aside from the time associated with completing the questionnaire and mild
discomfort that may arise in response to being asked about psychological symptoms and
personal experiences.
Alternatives: I may choose not to participate in this study. Payment, class standing or grades
will not be affected by my refusal to participate or withdrawal from this study. I understand that
there are other methods of obtaining extra credit in my introductory psychology class. I
understand that these opportunities are listed on the Subject Recruitment Board near the main
office in the Life Sciences Building and that my instructor can offer even more opportunities.
Benefits: I understand that this study is not expected to be of direct benefit to me, but the
knowledge gained may be of benefit to others. I understand that, for participating, I will be paid
$10.00 or receive two extra credit points in my introductory psychology class, but I understand
that other options are available for earning extra credit.
_______________
Participant’s Initials
Rev. 09/12/02

______
Date
1 of 2
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Consent and Information
Page 2
Title: Detection of Coached Malingering of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.
Financial Considerations: I understand that I will be paid $10.00 for participation in this phase
of the study unless I am a student, in which case I will receive two extra course credit points. I
also understand that if I successfully fake that I have Posttraumatic Stress Disorder I will be
entered into a drawing for an additional $50 cash prize.
Contact Persons: For more information about this research I can contact Jennifer L. Guriel,
M.A. or her supervisor, William Fremouw, Ph.D., at 293-2001 ext. 662. For more information on
my rights as a research participant, I may contact the Executive Secretary of the Institutional
Review Board of West Virginia University at (304) 293-7073.
Confidentiality: I understand that any information about me obtained as a result of my
participation in this research will be kept as confidential as legally possible. I understand also
that my research records, just like hospital records, may be subpoenaed by court order or may
be inspected by federal regulatory authorities. In any publications that result from this research,
neither my name nor any information from which I might be identified will be published without
my consent.
Voluntary Participation: Participation in this study is completely voluntary. I understand that I
am free to withdraw my consent to participate in this study at any time. I also understand that
refusal to participate or withdrawal will involve no penalty or loss of benefits and will not affect
my grades or class standing. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the
research, and I have received answers concerning the areas I did not understand.
Upon signing this form, I will receive a copy.
I willingly consent to participate in this research.

Signature of Participant

Date

Time

Signature of Investigator or
Investigator’s Representative

Date

Time

Rev. 09/12/02

2 of 2
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Because completion of surveys, such as the ones you just did, may make some persons realize
that they are experiencing an uncomfortable level of worry or depression, the investigators in
this study are providing all participating students this information form which lists several local
mental health and counseling services that are available to them if they feel that they would like
to talk with someone about their feelings.
Additionally, participants may contact Jennifer Guriel, M.A. or William Fremouw , Ph.D. at 2932001 x 31662 for a copy of this list.
This is a partial list of services in this area (Morgantown, WV) in case you feel that you need
assistance. Inclusion on this list does NOT imply endorsement of the agency by the
investigators in this study, nor does it in any way imply that the investigators are financially
responsible for any services requested or received as a result of participation in this study.
Carruth Center for Counseling and Psychological Services*
Student Services Center
West Virginia University
Morgantown, WV 26506
(304) 293-4431
Chestnut Ridge Hospital
930 Chestnut Ridge Road
Morgantown, WV 26505
(304) 293-4000
The Quin Curtis Center, Department of Psychology
West Virginia University
Morgantown, WV 26506
(304) 293-2001, ext 31671
Valley Comprehensive Community Mental Health Center
301 Scott Avenue
Morgantown, WV 26505
(304) 296-1731
The Vet Center (military veterans only)
Greenbag Road
Morgantown, WV 26505
(304) 291-4303
* Students who have paid WVU tuition and fees may receive services free of charge at this agency
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Appendix B
Coaching Materials Handout

Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder
“PTSD”
T = Trauma
R = Reliving
A = Arousal
A = Avoidance

T = Trauma




Experiencing or witnessing an event in which
you perceive that your own or someone else’s
life may be in danger
Examples include motor vehicle accidents,
natural disasters, rape, assault, serious
illness, etc.

R = Reliving
 Experiencing the feelings that you had
during the event again
 Examples include acting or feeling as if it
were happening all over again, having
dreams or nightmares about the event,
having upsetting thoughts or images
come into your head, feeling scared,
angry, sad, or guilty, etc.
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A = Arousal




Experiencing physical reactions when you think
of the event, being nervous or jumpy, having
trouble sleeping, feeling mad or irritated
Examples include sweating, feeling like your
heart is racing/pounding, feeling angry for no
reason, having trouble falling asleep or waking
up in the middle of the night, being jumpy or
easily startled, feeling like you have to check
to see who is behind you, feeling scared or
uncomfortable to be alone, etc.

A = Avoidance




Trying to stay away from people, places, or
things that remind you of the event or trying not
to remember things about the event
Examples include feeling alone or cut off from
people around you, feeling like you cannot cry
or have loving feelings, not being able to
remember details of the event, having trouble
concentrating, feeling hopeless about the future,
trying not to think about or talk about the event,
changing your routine so will not have to see
people, places or things that remind you of the
event, etc.

Strategies for Beating
Psychological Tests
B = Bizarre
O = Obvious
S = Stereotypical
S = Severe
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B = Bizarre




Do Not endorse overly BIZARRE or unusual
symptoms
For example, do not say that you feel or do
things that you have never heard of anyone
doing or that sound really weird or crazy to
you

O = Obvious




Do Not endorse too many OBVIOUS items
For example, do not say that you
experience every item that sounds like it
would be related to posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD).

S = Stereotypical




Do Not endorse only items that are
STEREOTYPICAL of PTSD
For example, do not endorse only things
that most people think of when they hear
PTSD (like having nightmares or avoiding
the scene of the event). Instead, endorse
these AND some of the PTSD symptoms
that are not as well known (like not being
able to cry or feel love).
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S = Severe




Do Not endorse too many SEVERE problems
For example, do not say that you have
every bad symptom that is listed. Most
people have one or two severe symptoms
and the rest of their symptoms are minor.
Do Not endorse too many SEVERE problems
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Appendix C
Naive Materials Handout

Hot Jobs
in
Psychology
New Trends and Areas
You Might Not Think of

FBI Agent



Research studies include interviewing
perpetrators and victims of violent crime to
increase knowledge and lead prevention
programs

 Salary range: $43,000 – $79,000

Microsoft

 Research into the usability and
“friendliness” of software and operating
systems. Also employed by IBM, EBay,
etc.
 Salary range: “Very Competitive”
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Armed Forces





Assessment and treatment of military
personnel and their families. Also includes
research into the policies and procedures that
the military develops and uses
Salary range: $30,000 – $40,000

Preventative Medicine



Development of materials and campaigns
designed to inform the general public about
disease and prevention. Also, consultation to
help doctors learn how to relate to their patients

 Salary range: “Competitive”

Marketing




Research and design of marketing
campaigns to inform the public and increase
a company’s sales
Salary range: $80,000 – $115,000 (Bayer)
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Congress




Counsel to Senator or Congressional
representative. Meets with lobbyists,
researches current issues, drafting
legislation, writing speeches. Ideal for a
J.D., Ph.D.
Salary range: “Competitive”

Grant Writing





Writing of grants to get highly competitive
federal and private research funding
Salary range: $75,000 – $97,000
(Nat’l. Inst. of Child Health & Human
Development)

Internet Analyst





Research and Design of websites that are
visually appealing and user friendly. Creation
of icons and animated “helpers”.
Salary: $70,000+
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Technical Writing




Editing and writing for scientific journals and
magazines. Allows for many brief projects
and a wide exposure to what’s new in science
Salary: $40,000 (Science)

Multi-tasking




Combination of research and/or teaching with
clinical practice
Salary range: “Competitive”
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Appendix D
Quiz
Participant#
Quiz
1. Complete the following summary of PTSD criteria:
T
R
A
A

2. Name 4 symptoms of PTSD:
1.
2.
3.
4.
3. Name 3 of the 4 strategies for beating psychological tests:
1.
2.
3.

Please read the statement and circle whichever is appropriate for you:
I have been instructed to:

(A) Answer honestly during the psychology tests and interview
(B) Pretend that I suffer from PTSD from a motor vehicle accident during the psychology
tests and interview
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Appendix E
Recruitment Advertisement
Recruitment Ad #3 for HS# 15285

NEED EXTRA CREDIT ???
If you are over 18 and have some free time, you may
qualify to participate in a research study and be
eligible to earn extra credit for your psychology class
and be entered into a cash lottery.

Participation in this research study is voluntary and
will involve meeting with a psychology student for
approximately 1-2 hours. During this time, you will
watch a videotape and be asked to answer a number of
questions.

If you would like to learn more about this research
study and how you can participate, please contact the
principle investigator,
Jennifer Guriel, M.A., at:
(304) 293-2001 x 31662 or jguriel@mix.wvu.edu

Revised October 25, 2002
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Footnotes
1

Though previous researchers have discussed results regarding the PAI
Malingering Index (PAI MI) in terms of raw scores, this study utilized T-Scores
(with T > 70 indicating elevation) for all analyses. This was done because the MI
is now included in the LOGIT scoring program and no longer has to be calculated
by hand.
2

The PDS uses a one-month time specifier. For the purposes of this study, this
constraint was waived and participants were asked to report on symptoms that
were experienced any time over one month post-event. This was done to
increase the attainability of the sample, while ruling out acute stress disorder.

3

For Chi2 analyses, raw data were used as the expected values for all
calculations. Percentages are presented in the results section and in tables and
figures for clarification and ease of interpretation purposes.
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Table 1
Validity Scores Across Conditions

Scale
M-FAST
Total
TSI ATR
TSI INC
TSI RL
PAI INC
PAI INF
PAI NIM
PAI PIM
PAI MI

Trauma
Positive,
Naive
n=35
13.4

Trauma
Positive,
Coached
n=31
6.42

Trauma
Negative,
Naive
n=22
11.0

Trauma
Negative,
Coached
n=25
6.92

(12.02)
80.9
(18.97)
53.3a
(10.77)
44.3
(5.59)
56.3a
(9.66)
61.0a
(11.28)
87.46
(24.59)
34.83
(7.76)
82.26
(25.73)

(4.27)
60.8
(19.06)
54.7a
(9.05)
48.0
(7.21)
56.8a
(8.30)
56.0a
(11.81)
65.90
(17.35)
44.03
(9.86)
63.39
(17.02)

(5.66)
80.2
(21.85)
53.2a
(11.56)
44.2
(5.15)
56.2a
(7.56)
63.6a
(15.86)
87.14
(30.28)
38.32
(9.90)
81.18
(29.73)

(3.95)
61.1
(18.66)
56.7a
(10.16)
51.5
(9.03)
55.4a
(6.56)
59.2a
(12.47)
67.12
(17.08)
43.24
(8.24)
63.12
(16.49)

Partial
Eta2
F(3,112)
5.82**

.138

9.59***

.209

.632

.017

6.76***

.157

.148

.004

1.72

.045

8.03***

.181

7.40***

.169

6.30**

.148

Note. M-FAST = Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test; TSI = Trauma
Symptom Inventory; ATR = Atypical Responding; INC = Inconsistency; RL = Response
Level; PAI = Personality Assessment Inventory; INC = Inconsistency; INF =
Infrequency; NIM = Negative Impression Management; PIM = Positive Impression
Management; MI = Malingering Index.
M-FAST scores are reported as Raw Scores; All others are T-Scores
Means in the same row that do not share superscripts differ.
*
p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Table 2
Validity Scale Main Effects
Coached
Scale
n=56
6.64
M-FAST
(4.10)
Total
TSI ATR
TSI INC
TSI RL
PAI INC
PAI INF
PAI NIM
PAI PIM
PAI MI

60.95
(18.71)
55.55a
(9.53)
49.54
(8.19)
56.18a
(7.54)
57.41a
(12.11)
66.45
(17.09)
43.68
(9.10)
63.27
(16.63)

Naive
n=57
12.47
(10.05)
80.63
(19.94)
53.28a
(10.98)
44.26
(5.38)
56.26a
(8.84)
61.98a
(13.16)
87.33
(26.66)
36.18
(8.73)
81.84
(27.08)

F(1,112)
14.02***

Partial
Eta2
.114

27.57***

.202

1.46

.013

17.39***

.138

.010

.000

3.753

.033

23.06***

.175

17.18***

.136

18.06***

.142

Note. M-FAST = Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test; TSI = Trauma
Symptom Inventory; ATR = Atypical Responding; INC = Inconsistency; RL = Response
Level; PAI = Personality Assessment Inventory; ARDT = Anxiety Related Disorders,
Trauma; INC = Inconsistency ; INF = Infrequency; NIM = Negative Impression
Management; PIM = Positive Impression Management; MI = Malingering Index.
M-FAST scores are reported as Raw Scores; All others are T-Scores
Means in the same row that do not share superscripts differ.
*
p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Table 3
TSI Clinical Subscale Mean Scores Across Conditions
Trauma
Trauma
Trauma
Trauma
Negative,
Negative,
Positive,
Positive,
Coached
Naive
Coached
Naive
TSI Scales
n=25
n=22
n=31
n=35
AA
69.54
62.58
67.36
59.12
(10.62)
(10.90)
(11.40)
(8.74)
DEP
68.43
56.87
65.45
54.88
(9.72)
(10.34)
(12.47)
(10.32)
ANG
65.37
57.35
62.59
54.04
(10.51)
(11.95)
(11.30)
(12.21)
INTR
73.60
66.06
71.36
61.84
(11.62)
(10.65)
(13.78)
(8.55)
DA
66.77
60.06
66.27
58.28
(9.17)
(8.78)
(10.19)
(8.61)
DISS
73.86
60.42
69.14
58.20
(11.39)
(12.18)
(14.59)
(8.73)
SEXC
63.89
53.65
64.77
54.32
(12.14)
(11.06)
(13.65)
(14.21)
DYSSEX
70.57
62.45
70.41
58.12
(16.50)
(16.68)
(18.64)
(16.18)
ISR
67.31
56.10
66.23
55.64
(9.33)
(9.13)
(11.49)
(9.09)
TRB
75.09
66.03
74.64
62.88
(15.17)
(16.03)
(15.55)
(14.67)

F(3, 112)

Partial
Eta2

5.74**

.136

11.22***

.236

5.75**

.137

6.30**

.148

6.20**

.146

11.64***

.243

6.26**

.147

3.59*

.090

12.23***

.252

4.41**

.108

Note. TSI = Trauma Symptom Inventory; AA = Anxious Arousal; DEP = Depression;
ANG = Anger/Irritability; INTR = Intrusive Experiences; DA = Defensive Avoidance;
DISS = Dissociation; SEXC = Sexual Concerns; DYSSEX = Dysfunctional Sexual
Behavior; ISR = Impaired Self Reference; TRB = Tension Reduction Behavior.
All reported scores are T-Scores.
*
p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Means in the same row that do not share superscripts differ.
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Table 4
TSI Clinical Subscale Main Effects

TSI Scales
AA
DEP
ANG
INTR
DA
DISS
SEXC
DYSSEX
ISR
TRB

Coached
n=56
61.04
(10.06)
55.98
(10.28)
55.88
(12.07)
64.18
(9.91)
59.27
(8.67)
59.43
(10.75)
53.95
(12.45)
60.52
(16.45)
55.89
(9.03)
64.63
(15.38)

Naive
n=57
68.70
(10.88)
67.28
(10.85)
64.30
(10.81)
72.74
(12.43)
66.58
(9.49)
72.04
(12.81)
64.23
(12.63)
70.51
(17.20)
66.89
(10.13)
74.91
(15.18)

F(1,112)
14.40***

Partial
Eta2
.117

29.82***

.215

14.31***

.116

15.79***

.127

17.64***

.139

29.20***

.211

18.29***

.144

9.95**

.084

34.68***

.241

12.52**

.103

Note. TSI = Trauma Symptom Inventory; AA = Anxious Arousal; DEP = Depression;
ANG = Anger/Irritability; INTR = Intrusive Experiences; DA = Defensive Avoidance;
DISS = Dissociation; SEXC = Sexual Concerns; DYSSEX = Dysfunctional Sexual
Behavior; ISR = Impaired Self Reference; TRB = Tension Reduction Behavior.
All reported scores are T-Scores.
*
p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Malingering PTSD 51
Table 5
Percent of Participants with Elevated TSI Clinical Scales by Coaching

TSI Scales
(65+)

Coached
n=56

Naive
n=57

χ2

Eta

AA
DEP
ANG
INTR
DA
DISS
SEXC
DYSSEX
ISR
TRB

30%
27%
25%
50%
30%
34%
21%
43%
20%
46%

70%
67%
51%
74%
65%
77%
49%
58%
54%
72%

17.92***
18.04***
8.02**
6.72*
13.52***
21.43***
9.47**
2.56
14.60***
7.61**

.398
.400
.266
.244
.346
.436
.290
.150
.359
.260

Note. TSI = Trauma Symptom Inventory; AA = Anxious Arousal; DEP = Depression;
ANG = Anger/Irritability; INTR = Intrusive Experiences; DA = Defensive Avoidance;
DISS = Dissociation; SEXC = Sexual Concerns; DYSSEX = Dysfunctional Sexual
Behavior; ISR = Impaired Self Reference; TRB = Tension Reduction Behavior.
*
p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Table 6
Percent of Participants with Elevated TSI Clinical Scales by Trauma

TSI Scales
(65+)
AA
DEP
ANG
INTR
DA
DISS
SEXC
DYSSEX
ISR
TRB

Trauma
Positive
n=66
56%
52%
41%
68%
53%
61%
35%
53%
38%
61%

Trauma
Negative
n=47
43%
40%
34%
53%
40%
49%
36%
47%
36%
57%

χ2

Eta

2.00
1.36
.549
2.62
1.75
1.52
.021
.425
.034
.114

.133
.110
.070
.152
.124
.116
.014
.061
.017
.032

Note. TSI = Trauma Symptom Inventory; AA = Anxious Arousal; DEP = Depression;
ANG = Anger/Irritability; INTR = Intrusive Experiences; DA = Defensive Avoidance;
DISS = Dissociation; SEXC = Sexual Concerns; DYSSEX = Dysfunctional Sexual
Behavior; ISR = Impaired Self Reference; TRB = Tension Reduction Behavior.
*
p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Table 7
PAI Clinical, Treatment, and Interpersonal Subscale Mean Scores Across Conditions

PAI
Scales
SOM
ANX
ARD
ARDT
DEP
MAN
PAR
SCZ
BORD
ANT
ALC
DRG
AGG
SUI
STR
NON
RXR
DOM
WRM

Trauma
Positive,
Naive
n=35
77.54
(14.70)
82.74
(14.06)
82.11
(15.36)
83.83
(14.33)
85.97
(14.39)
57.91
(9.28)
78.71
(14.53)
80.89
(17.86)
76.69
(10.79)
70.31
(14.22)
74.80a
(15.20)
73.66a
(19.04)
68.17
(11.37)
78.26
(23.20)
69.69
(13.40)
72.37
(14.98)
40.69a
(7.87)
39.03
(12.12)
30.11a
(12.42)

Trauma
Positive,
Coached
n=31
61.42
(14.18)
69.90
(13.53)
69.06
(13.33)
72.03
(13.81)
69.71
(14.17)
49.74
(12.57)
64.52
(12.13)
62.90
(12.43)
65.45
(9.29)
60.55
(12.23)
65.90a
(17.69)
64.90a
(18.63)
58.84
(14.78)
60.29
(14.13)
61.48
(11.40)
61.23
(13.49)
45.61a
(8.06)
41.84a
(14.88)
37.35a
(12.09)

Trauma
Negative,
Naive
n=22
76.32
(18.96)
79.95
(16.45)
82.18
(17.01)
81.23
(16.16)
82.55
(17.79)
58.09
(9.35)
74.55
(17.93)
78.50
(20.07)
74.23
(11.93)
64.18
(13.85)
69.09a
(17.35)
73.45a
(21.64)
66.09
(14.92)
76.82
(24.10)
69.36
(13.09)
70.18
(19.21)
43.41a
(9.47)
41.50a
(12.63)
33.73a
(16.20)

Trauma
Negative,
Coached
n=25
61.56
(10.97)
73.72
(12.39)
69.48
(13.79)
71.28
(11.10)
70.96
(12.31)
52.40
(14.50)
66.04
(13.97)
64.00
(15.27)
65.16
(8.72)
59.68
(13.52)
64.96a
(17.60)
64.32a
(17.12)
58.08
(14.78)
60.40
(15.76)
58.60
(12.63)
60.16
(13.92)
43.12a
(7.88)
43.56a
(13.81)
38.80a
(15.52)

Partial Eta2
F(3, 112)
10.51***

.224

5.33**

.128

7.11***

.164

6.18**

.145

9.37***

.205

3.76*

.094

6.74***

.156

9.66***

.210

10.07***

.217

4.10**

.101

2.21

.057

2.07

.054

3.98*

.099

7.32***

.168

5.41**

.130

4.79**

.116

1.97

.051

.591

.016

2.42

.063
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Note. PAI = Personality Assessment Inventory; SOM = Somatic Complaints ANX =
Anxiety; ARD = Anxiety Related Disorders; ARDT = Anxiety Related Disorders, Trauma;
DEP = Depression; MAN = Mania; PAR = Paranoia; SCZ = Schizophrenia; BORD =
Borderline Features; ANT = Antisocial Features; ALC = Alcohol Problems; DRG= Drug
Problems; AGG = Aggression ; SUI = Suicidal Ideation; STR = Stress; NON =
Nonsupport; RXR = Treatment Rejection; Dom = Dominance; WRM = Warmth.
All reported scores are T-Scores.
*
p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Means in the same row that do not share superscripts differ.
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Table 8
PAI Clinical, Treatment, and Interpersonal Subscale Main Effects

PAI
Scales
SOM
ANX
ARD
ARDT
DEP
MAN
PAR
SCZ
BORD
ANT
ALC
DRG
AGG
SUI
STR
NON
RXR
DOM
WRM

Coached
n=56
61.48
(12.74)
71.61
(13.06)
69.25
(13.41)
71.70
(12.57)
70.27
(13.27)
50.93
(13.40)
65.20
(12.88)
63.39
(13.65)
65.32
(8.96)
60.16
(12.71)
65.48
(17.50)
64.64
(17.81)
58.50
(14.65)
60.34
(14.74)
60.20
(11.94)
60.75
(13.57)
44.50a
(8.00)
42.61a
(14.31)
38.00
(13.62)

Naive
n=57
77.07
(16.32)
81.67
(14.95)
82.14
(15.87)
82.82
(14.97)
84.65
(15.72)
57.98
(9.23)
77.11
(15.91)
79.96
(18.07)
75.74
(11.20)
67.95
(14.27)
72.60
(16.16)
73.58
(19.89)
67.37
(12.77)
77.70
(23.34)
69.56
(13.16)
71.53
(16.61)
41.74a
(8.55)
39.98a
(12.27)
31.51
(13.97)

F(1,112)
29.85***

Partial
Eta2
.215

12.56**

.103

20.60***

.159

16.67***

.133

24.76***

.185

9.84**

.083

16.68***

.133

26.62***

.196

27.04***

.199

7.67**

.066

4.08*

.036

6.02*

.052

10.74**

.090

20.76***

.160

15.38***

.124

13.10***

.107

2.16

.019

.903

.008

5.40*

.047
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Note. PAI = Personality Assessment Inventory; SOM = Somatic Complaints ANX =
Anxiety; ARD = Anxiety Related Disorders; ARDT = Anxiety Related Disorders, Trauma;
DEP = Depression; MAN = Mania; PAR = Paranoia; SCZ = Schizophrenia; BORD =
Borderline Features; ANT = Antisocial Features; ALC = Alcohol Problems; DRG= Drug
Problems; AGG = Aggression ; SUI = Suicidal Ideation; STR = Stress; NON =
Nonsupport; RXR = Treatment Rejection; Dom = Dominance; WRM = Warmth.
All reported scores are T-Scores.
*
p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Means in the same row that do not share superscripts differ.
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Table 9
Percent of Participants with Elevated PAI Clinical, Treatment, or Interpersonal Scales by
Coaching

PAI
Scales
(70+)
SOM
ANX
ARD
ARDT
DEP
MAN
PAR
SCZ
BORD
ANT
ALC
DRG
AGG
SUI
STR
NON
RXR
DOM
WRM

Coached
n=56

Naive
n=57

χ2

Eta

27%
57%
46%
52%
52%
11%
38%
30%
32%
30%
46%
41%
20%
25%
20%
27%
0%
5%
0%

74%
81%
81%
75%
79%
11%
63%
68%
74%
47%
70%
60%
47%
63%
56%
47%
0%
0%
0%

24.85***
7.333**
14.35***
6.84**
9.22**
.001
7.44**
16.37***
19.57***
3.44
6.56*
3.90*
9.73**
16.67***
15.96***
5.12*
N/A
3.14
N/A

.469
.255
.356
.246
.286
.003
.257
.381
.416
.174
.241
.186
.293
.384
.376
.213
N/A
.167
N/A

Note. PAI = Personality Assessment Inventory; SOM = Somatic Complaints ANX =
Anxiety; ARD = Anxiety Related Disorders; ARDT = Anxiety Related Disorders, Trauma;
DEP = Depression; MAN = Mania; PAR = Paranoia; SCZ = Schizophrenia; BORD =
Borderline Features; ANT = Antisocial Features; ALC = Alcohol Problems; DRG= Drug
Problems; AGG = Aggression ; SUI = Suicidal Ideation; STR = Stress; NON =
Nonsupport; RXR = Treatment Rejection; Dom = Dominance; WRM = Warmth.
*

p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Table 10
Percent of Participants with Elevated PAI Clinical, Treatment, or Interpersonal Scales by
Trauma

PAI
Scales
(70+)
SOM
ANX
ARD
ARDT
DEP
MAN
PAR
SCZ
BORD
ANT
ALC
DRG
AGG
SUI
STR
NON
RXR
DOM
WRM

Trauma
Positive
n=66
55%
65%
64%
67%
67%
9%
53%
52%
59%
44%
62%
52%
35%
47%
38%
36%
0%
3%
0%

Trauma
Negative
n=47
45%
74%
64%
60%
64%
13%
47%
47%
45%
32%
53%
49%
32%
40%
38%
38%
0%
2%
0%

χ2

Eta

1.07
1.11
.000
.597
.098
.391
.425
.243
2.29
1.67
.901
.073
.106
.477
.002
.044
N/A
.087
N/A

.097
.099
.002
.073
.029
.059
.061
.046
.142
.122
.089
.025
.031
.065
.004
.020
N/A
.028
N/A

Note. PAI = Personality Assessment Inventory; SOM = Somatic Complaints ANX =
Anxiety; ARD = Anxiety Related Disorders; ARDT = Anxiety Related Disorders, Trauma;
DEP = Depression; MAN = Mania; PAR = Paranoia; SCZ = Schizophrenia; BORD =
Borderline Features; ANT = Antisocial Features; ALC = Alcohol Problems; DRG= Drug
Problems; AGG = Aggression ; SUI = Suicidal Ideation; STR = Stress; NON =
Nonsupport; RXR = Treatment Rejection; Dom = Dominance; WRM = Warmth.
All reported scores are T-Scores.
*
p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Table 11
Mean M-FAST Scales by Condition
Trauma
Positive,
Naive
n=35
13.40

Trauma
Positive,
Coached
n=31
6.42

Trauma
Negative,
Naive
n=22
11.00

Trauma
Negative,
Coached
n=25
6.92

F (3,112)
5.82**

Partial
Eta2
.138

(12.02)
1.77

(4.27)
1.29

(5.66)
1.68

(3.95)
1.20

2.88*

.073

Extreme

(.808)
2.03

(1.006)
.97

(.945)
2.09

(.816)
1.36

6.75***

.157

Symptomatology

(1.10)

( 1.05)

(1.48)

(.860)

3.89

2.29

3.64

2.12

6.45***

.151

(1.875)

(1.657)

(2.460)

(1.740)

2.00

.65

1.64

.88

8.65***

.192

(1.21)

(1.08)

(1.47)

(1.05)

.74a

.55a

.77a

.68a

1.22

.033

(.505)

(.506)

(.429)

(.476)

.83

.65

.86

.56

2.93*

.075

(.382)

(.486)

(.351)

(507)

.31

.03

.32

.12

4.09**

.101

(.471)

(.180)

(.477)

(.332)

M-FAST Scale
Total

Reported/
Observed

Rare Symptom
Combination

Unusual
Hallucinations
Unusual
Symptom Course
Negative Self
Image
Suggestibility

M-FAST = Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test
All reported scores are Raw Scores.
*
p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Note. Means in the same row that do not share superscripts differ.
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Table 12
M-FAST Main Effects
Coached
n=56

Naive
n=57

F(1,112)

Partial
Eta2

6.64

12.47

14.02***

.114

(4.10)
1.25

(10.05)
1.74

7.91**

.068

Extreme

(.919)
1.14

(.856)
2.05

17.40***

.138

Symptomatology

(.980)

(1.25)

Rare Symptom

2.21

3.79

17.96***

.141

Combination

(1.68)

(2.10)

Unusual

.75

1.86

21.18***

.163

Hallucinations

(1.07)

(1.32)

Unusual

.61a

.75a

2.395

.021

Symptom Course

(.493)

(.474)

Negative Self Image

.61

.84

8.49**

.072

Suggestibility

(.493)
.07

(.368)
.32

10.79**

.090

(.260)

(.469)

M-FAST Scale
Total

Reported/
Observed

M-FAST = Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test
All reported scores are Raw Scores.
*
p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Note. Means in the same row that do not share superscripts differ.
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Table 13
Percent of Participants with Elevated Scales by Coaching Condition
Scale Elevation or
Classification
M-FAST Total
(6+)
TSI ATR
(61+)
TSI INC
(65+)
TSI RL
(65+)
TSI PTSD
(2+ elevations)
PAI ARDT
(70+)
PAI INC
(70+)
PAI INF
(70+)
PAI NIM
(70+)
PAI PIM
(70+)
PAI MI
(70+)
PAI PTSD
(Diagnosis Suggested)
Malingering Status

Detailed Malingering
Status

Coached
n=56
52%

Naive
n=57
84%

χ2
13.68***

Eta
.348

32%

82%

29.27***

.509

13%

14%

.058

.023

7%

0%

4.22*

.193

64%

86%

7.12**

.251

52%

75%

6.84**

.246

7%

12%

.849

.357

20%

26%

.710

.399

43%

75%

12.42***

.332

0%

0%

N/A

N/A

39%

70%

10.88**

.310

39%

68%

9.65**

.292

7% S
77% I
16% NE
7% S
5% IPT
11% IM
0% ITM
9% IT
9% IPM
11% IP
32% IPTM
2% NET
9% NEP
5%NETP

0% S
95% I
5% NE
0% S
9% IPT
5% IM
4% ITM
4% IT
4% IPM
0% IP
68% IPTM
0% NET
2% NEP
4%NETP

8.24*

.270

26.88**

.488
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Note. M-FAST = Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test; TSI = Trauma
Symptom Inventory; ATR = Atypical Responding; INC = Inconsistency; RL = Response
Level; TSI PTSD = At least two clinical scale elevations on TSI; PAI = Personality
Assessment Inventory; ARDT = Anxiety Related Disorders, Trauma; INC =
Inconsistency ; INF = Infrequency; NIM = Negative Impression Management; PIM =
Positive Impression Management; MI = Malingering Index; PAI PTSD = PTSD was
suggested in the diagnostic constellations of the PAI interpretive report; S = Successful
Malingerer; I = Invalid on at least one validity scale; NE = No elevations to suggest
PTSD symptomatology; IPT = Invalid PAI + TSI; IM = Invalid M-FAST; ITM = Invalid TSI
+ M-FAST; IT = Invalid TSI; IPM = Invalid PAI + M-FAST; IP = Invalid PAI; IPTM =
Invalid PAI + TSI + M-FAST; NET = No Elevations on TSI; NEP = PAI does not suggest
PTSD; NETP = No Elevations on TSI + PAI does not suggest PTSD.
*

p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Table 14
Percent of Participants with Elevated Scales or Who Meet Criteria by Trauma

Scale Elevation or
Classification
M-FAST
Total
(6+)
TSI ATR
(61+)
TSI INC
(65+)
TSI RL
(65+)
TSI PTSD
(2+ elevations)
PAI ARDT
(70+)
PAI INC
(70+)
PAI INF
(70+)
PAI NIM
(70+)
PAI PIM
(70+)
PAI MI
(70+)
PAI PTSD
(Diagnosis
Suggested)
Malingering Status

Detailed
Malingering Status

Trauma
Positive
n=66
70%

Trauma
Negative
n=47
66%

χ2

Eta

.177

.040

61%

53%

.618

.074

11%

17%

.981

.093

3%

4%

.121

.033

80%

68%

2.199

.139

67%

60%

.597

.073

14%

4%

2.75

.156

20%

28%

.983

.093

64%

53%

1.24

.105

0%

0%

N/A

N/A

59%

49%

1.14

.101

52%

57%

.389

.059

3% S
88% I
9% NE
3% S
8% IPT
6% IM
3% ITM
6% IT
9% IPM
6% IP
50% IPTM

4% S
83% I
13% NE
4% S
6% IPT
11% IM
0% ITM
6% IT
4% IPM
4% IP
51% IPTM

.542

.069

4.99

.210
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2% NET
5% NEP
3%NETP

0% NET
6% NEP
6%NETP

Note. M-FAST = Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test; TSI = Trauma
Symptom Inventory; ATR = Atypical Responding; INC = Inconsistency; RL = Response
Level; TSI PTSD = At least two clinical scale elevations on TSI; PAI = Personality
Assessment Inventory; ARDT = Anxiety Related Disorders, Trauma; INC =
Inconsistency ; INF = Infrequency; NIM = Negative Impression Management; PIM =
Positive Impression Management; MI = Malingering Index; PAI PTSD = PTSD was
suggested in the diagnostic constellations of the PAI interpretive report; S = Successful
Malingerer; I = Invalid on at least one validity scale; NE = No elevations to suggest
PTSD symptomatology; IPT = Invalid PAI + TSI; IM = Invalid M-FAST; ITM = Invalid TSI
+ M-FAST; IT = Invalid TSI; IPM = Invalid PAI + M-FAST; IP = Invalid PAI; IPTM =
Invalid PAI + TSI + M-FAST; NET = No Elevations on TSI; NEP = PAI does not suggest
PTSD; NETP = No Elevations on TSI + PAI does not suggest PTSD.
*
p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Mean T scores (M-FAST raw scores) of validity indices across conditions.
Figure 2. Mean T scores of TSI clinical scales across conditions.
Figure 3. Mean T scores of PAI clinical, treatment, and interpersonal scales across
conditions.
Figure 4. Mean M-FAST raw scores across conditions.
Figure 5. Malingering status percentages for trauma positive groups.
Figure 6. Malingering status percentages for trauma negative groups.
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Figure 1
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Figure 2
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Figure 3
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Figure 4
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Figure 5
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Figure 6
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